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STRUCTURE AND PROCESS, POLITICS AND POLICY:
ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE
POLITICAL CONTROL OF AGENCIES
Matthew D. McCubbins, * Roger G. Noll, ** and Barry R. Weingast***
I N 1977, Congress substantially revised the Clean Air Act,1 the nation's
flagship legislation on environmental policy. Many changes were consid-
ered, and among those that Congress adopted was an intricate redefinition of
the procedures to be used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
in making rules.2 The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (1970 Amend-
ments), which had moved responsibility for air pollution regulation from the
Public Health Service in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) to the newly minted EPA, set up the EPA's rulemaking procedures
as "informal" with few procedural requirements and considerable decisional
flexibility.' After extensive debate in both the 94th and 95th Congresses,4
Congress changed this to a new hybrid process (more formal than "informal
rulemaking" but less formal than "formal rulemaking") that requires a more
elaborate written record and a clearer statement of agency intentions and of
the bases for its decisions.'
As a reading of the committee reports and floor debates about these and
similar proposals makes clear, legislators regard the choice of administrative
structure and process as vitally important.6 The legislative history of admin-
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I Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2 See id. § 305, 91 Stat. at 774 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1982)); see also H.R. Rep.
No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1077,
1105 ("This section establishes comprehensive procedures for most informal rulemaking under
the Clean Air Act in lieu of the Administrative Procedure Act.").
3 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 3, 84 Stat. 1676, 1677
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1982)).
4 See infra notes 121-56 and accompanying text.
s See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 302, 91 Stat. 685, 770
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1982)).
6 As used here, "process" refers to the rules and standards that apply to policy decisions by
an agency and guide judicial review, whereas "structure" refers to the allocation of resources
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istrative reforms contains discussion of two issues that also surface in the
scholarly literature. As emphasized by public administration and organiza-
tion theory scholars, legislators are concerned about agency efficiency in
collecting and evaluating relevant information to guide administrative deci-
sions, and in implementing these decisions.7 Also, as emphasized by schol-
ars of administrative law, legislators debate fairness and the protection of
individual rights when considering alternative institutional arrangements.'
In addition, the choice of structure and process is guided by political con-
cerns. Specifically, legislators see the choice of administrative structures and
processes as important in assuring that agencies produce policy outcomes
that legislators deem satisfactory. Structure and process are regarded as
important in determining the relative influence of different interests in .the
decisionmaking process, as well as the balance of influence between the Pres-
ident and Congress. The purpose of this Article is to contribute to the posi-
tive political theory of the structure and process of administrative agencies.
In a previous article,9 we explained our view of how elected political lead-
ers design administrative procedures. We asserted that administrative pro-
cedures are one means of guiding agencies to make decisions that are
consistent with the preferences of the legislative coalition (including the
President) that succeeded in passing the agency's enabling legislation, but
without requiring the members of that coalition to monitor, or even be aware
of, the nature of the agency's actions.10 This Article advances the discussion
in three ways.
First, we explicitly take into account that elected political officials may
differ over their desired policy outcomes. In so doing, this Article more
clearly identifies the kinds of internal coalitional problems that structure and
process might be expected to solve. Specifically, structure and process can
be viewed as embodying an ex ante agreement among legislators and the
and decisional authority among agencies and within an agency. Examples of process are rules
of standing and evidence and the assignment of burdens of proof, whereas a flow chart
depicting the sequence of actions and identifying the associated actors would reveal examples
of structure. Most often, structure refers to "veto gates"-those points in the process where
policy can be killed-and which actors control them.
7 See, e.g., J. Charlesworth, Governmental Administration 45-86 (1951); J. Millett,
Government and Public Administration: The Quest for Responsible Performance 63-250
(1963); J. Pflffner & R. Presthus, Public Administration 443-536 (1960); J. Shafritz & A. Hyde,
Classics of Public Administration (1987); J. Shafritz & J. Ott, Classics of Organization Theory
(1987).
8 See, e.g., J. Shafritz & A. Hyde, supra note 7; Berger, Administrative Law After Forty
Years, 33 Fed. B. News J. 297 (1986).
9 McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. Econ. & Org. 243 (1987).
10 Id. at 253-55.
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President that limits the ability of each to engage in ex post opportunistic
behavior. Because each has an incentive to influence the agency to make
policies that are not consistent with the coalition's legislative agreement, all
can be better off if they employ means to limit their own opportunism.
Second, this Article identifies and analyzes a key problem with the use of
traditional methods of oversight and rewards or punishments to assure
agency compliance with the policy preferences of the winning coalition. Spe-
cifically, this is the problem of "history dependence" or "reactive enforce-
ment" in legislative processes. For reasons elaborated below, the outcome of
a legislative attempt to rectify an act of noncompliance by an agency will
not, in general, reproduce the policy outcome that was sought by the win-
ning coalition, even if the preferences of the members of the legislative body
remain unchanged. Thus, effective political control of an agency requires ex
ante constraints on the agency (that is, a means of restricting the agency's
decisionmaking before it actually makes policy choices), one source of which
is manipulation of its structure and process.
Third, to illustrate the principal lines of argument, this Article traces the
organizational and procedural history of air pollution regulation in the
United States. The discussion of air pollution regulation is not intended to
be comprehensive; indeed, several excellent books have been written on the
subject.11  Instead, we provide examples of structural and procedural
reforms considered by Congress, many of which were never enacted, that
exemplify our general conceptual model.
I. STRUCTURE, PROCESS, AND BUREAUCRATIC COMPLIANCE
In examining the problem of assuring agency compliance with the desires
of the political coalition enacting and overseeing legislation, we make use of
three related theoretical advances of the 1970s: principal-agent theory,12 per-
fect equilibrium,13 and structure-induced equilibrium.14
Principal-agent theory applies to circumstances when one person (the
principal) arranges for another (the agent) to take an action that is beneficial
Ii See, e.g., B. Ackerman & W. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air (1981); R. Melnick,
Regulation and the Courts (1983).
12 See Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. Econ. 74 (1979) (considering
the role of imperfect information and moral hazard in principal-agent relationships).
13 See Selten, Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in
Extensive Games, 4 Int'l J. Game Theory 25 (1975) (discussing the concept of a perfect
equilibrium where the equilibrium is robust to slight mistakes).
14 See Shepsle & Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 Pub.
Choice 503 (1981) (explaining the properties of legislative institutions necessary for the




to the principal but costly to the agent, under circumstances when the prin-
cipal cannot perfectly and costlessly enforce an ex ante promise by the agent
to act in the best interests of the principal. For the purposes of this Article,
the principal in the problem of bureaucratic compliance is the coalition
enacting a new policy and establishing a structure and process for imple-
menting it. The agent is the bureau that is to implement the policy.
The standard solution to a principal-agent problem is: first, for the two
actors to agree on a compensation schedule that the principal will implement
on the basis of the outcome of the agent's actions; and second, for the princi-
pal to engage in costly monitoring to enable the principal to assess the
agent's performance. The counterpart in political processes is oversight:
investigations into the performance of an agency, sometimes in the context
of the annual budgetary process, and occasionally as part of the reauthoriza-
tion of an agency's programs. In addition, both Congress and the President
have "watchdog" agencies to monitor agency performance, such as the
Office of Management and Budget and the General Accounting Office.
An important disadvantage of the investigative oversight process is its
cost. The time of political officials and their staffs is a valuable resource, and
normal oversight consumes it. An alternative is to set up a system in which
someone else (that is, a third party outside of the principal-agent diad)
monitors the agent and reports acts of noncompliance. In political
processes, the object of legislation is to deliver benefits to the policy's target
group. If politicians make it easy for this group to detect and report non-
compliance, they need not use their own resources in monitoring the agency.
Instead, a politician who was a member of the coalition that enacted a pro-
gram can rely on "fire alarms" sounded by the targeted beneficiaries as a
mechanism to trigger formal investigations and/or legislative responses to
noncompliance. 15
A fire alarm converts the oversight job of a politician from active monitor
to reactive servant of affected constituencies, and fits nicely with the observa-
tion that the role of a modern legislator is more like that of an ombudsman
than a policymaker.16 But the effectiveness of the fire alarm depends on the
credibility of political officials when they threaten to punish an agency that is
not complying with the wishes of its overseers. That is, if an agency prefers
to adopt a policy that differs significantly from the preference of the coalition
that enacted its program, it can be dissuaded from doing so only if its polit-
ical overseers are able to undo its actions and/or punish it.
Is See McCubbins & Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus
Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165 (1984).
16 See M. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment 42-49 (1977);
Fiorina & Noll, Majority Rule Models and Legislative Elections, 41 J. Pol. 1081, 1101 (1979).
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For several reasons, agencies may not regard threats of punishment as
credible, especially if the threats are from Congress. Most of these reasons
are discussed in our earlier article,17 and we will not reprise them here.
Instead, we focus on two points. First, the President's role in appointing the
top administrators of agencies offers him an advantage in influencing policy,
especially for agencies in the executive branch where the top administrators
serve at the pleasure of the President. Hence, we expect that an enduring
theme in Congress will be to build in protections against undue influence by
the President. Second, Congress and the President cannot rely on their abil-
ity to correct a noncomplying decision by an agency through legislative
action, whether by changing its mandate, its structure, its procedures, or its
budget. The reason is to be found in the theory of structure-induced equilib-
rium and, in particular, in the dependence of legislative processes on the
details of the status quo that legislative action is supposed to alter.
A. Potential Manipulation by the Agency
To see why Congress and the President cannot rely solely on the threat of
new legislation to force agency compliance, we consider the following exam-
ple.18 Although our example is very simple, it illustrates the general propo-
sition that different status quo policies produce different legislative
outcomes.
To begin, we assume that the game between politicians and agencies is
played only once-that is, the agency chooses a policy that the politicians
can either accept or reject by passing new legislation. Consider a three-per-
son unicameral legislative body picking a policy in a two-dimensional policy
space, as depicted below in Figure 1. Each member is assumed to have com-
mon knowledge about the structure of the game and the preferences of all
other players. Anticipating the analysis of air pollution regulation in Part II
of this Article,19 the dimensions could be the stringency of environmental
policy (for example, how much pollution to abate) and the extent to which
antipollution policy will be structured to advantage established (as opposed
17 See McCubbins, Nol & Weingast, supra note 9, at 248-53.
Is The example that follows is in the spirit of the model developed by Hammond, Hill, and
Miller and provides the analysis necessary to understand the problem of manipulation of
politicians by their agents. As we show below, however, the appropriate interpretation of this
model is that it characterizes the problem to be solved, not the actual pattern of interaction
between an agency and politicians. See T. Hammond, J. Hill & G. Miller, Presidential
Appointment of Bureau Chiefs and the "Congressional Control of Administration"
Hypothesis (March 30, 1986) (unpublished paper delivered at a meeting of the American
Political Science Association).
19 See infra notes 36-148 and accompanying text.
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to entering) production facilities. The points labeled 1, 2, and C represent




We also assume that the loss of welfare to each member as the policy
moves away from that person's ideal point is proportional to the distance
from that ideal point (that is, their indifference contours can be represented
as circles). If this is the case, the triangle defined by the lines connecting the
three ideal points contains all of the Pareto optimal outcomes-that is, the
policy choices that cannot be changed without making one of the three
members worse off. The point Qo represents the status quo, which is the
policy that will be in place if the legislature takes no action. Finally, mem-
ber C is a one-person committee that has jurisdiction over the policy under
consideration. We assume for simplicity that member C possesses a monop-
oly on making proposals to change the status quo, and that these proposals
are considered by the legislature (that is, C together with members I and 2)
under a "closed rule" wherein the members simply vote for C's proposal or
the status quo.20
Assuming that each member seeks to move policy closer to his or her ideal
point, the best strategy available to member C is to propose an alternative
that comes as close to point C as possible while still obtaining the support of
at least one other legislator, thereby defeating the status quo by a vote of at
20 Closed rules (i.e., where a member's ability to offer amendments to a bill on the floor is
restricted) are not common in the House of Representatives and are virtually never adopted in
the Senate. Although the details of the rules pertaining to a bill clearly influence the nature of
legislative outcomes, the basic processes at work are similar for the closed rule and produce
qualitatively similar results. See Wingast, Floor Behavior in Congress: Committee Power
Under the Open Rule, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. (forthcoming Sept. 1989).
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least two to one. C can find this point by locating the points in the triangle
that either 1 or 2 regards as equally desirable as the status quo. We have
drawn indifference contours (1 and 12) for both legislators I and 2 that pass
through status quo point Qo. As is apparent from inspection, point B0 is the
best alternative for member C. If C proposes a bill slightly closer to member
1 than point Bo, the proposal will defeat Qo by a vote of two to one. Mem-
bers 1 and C, therefore, can be regarded as having formed a coalition to
enact B0, which then becomes the new status quo.
The problem of a noncomplying agency is depicted on the diagram as
follows. Suppose that the agency implements not B0 but Q, which thus
becomes the new status quo point. Then, in the next session of the legisla-
ture, the best proposal that C can hope to enact is bill B1, which is passed by
a new coalition between C and 2. (12' is the indifference contour for legisla-
tor 2 when the status quo point is Q1.) Although B is preferred to B0 by
member 2, members I and C are worse off than at outcome B0. Moreover,
by slight modifications in the diagram, one can depict circumstances in
which agency noncompliance makes any given member, or any combination
of two members, worse off than at outcome B0.
The important insight from this example is that, even with perfect moni-
toring of agency noncompliance, no legislative remedy is available to the
original coalition that will restore its original agreement.2 1 By establishing a
new status quo, a noncomplying agency has broken apart the coalition that
gave rise to its initial mandate. Of course, this phenomenon is quite gen-
eral-agency noncompliance in other directions away from B0 inflicts a dif-
ferent pattern of gains and losses and causes different coalitional responses.
Hence, each party, including the legislator who is not a member of the origi-
nal coalition, stands some chance of loss from agency noncompliance. If
legislators are risk averse,2 2 unpredictability in the nature of agency non-
compliance will be regarded by all as undesirable. Thus, they will all have an
incentive to develop some means of assuring compliance other than correc-
tion of errors after they are observed.
So far, our analysis has focused entirely on members of a legislature, but
with a few changes it can be altered to represent the policy tug-of-war among
the House, the Senate, and the President. For purposes of exposition, we
21 The unqualified nature of this conclusion depends on the one-shot assumption noted
above. When the relationship is repeated, more complicated patterns of interaction can arise.
22 Legislators are likely to behave as if they are risk averse, even if they are personally risk
neutral, if their constituents punish unpredictable policy choices or their reelection probability
is nearly unity. See L. Cohen & R. Noll, Intertemporal Policy Preferences of a Legislator
(Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University 1984). See generally, D. Mayhew,
Congress: The Electoral Connection 13-17 (1974) (explaining how legislative behavior is
affected by the quest for reelection).
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will ignore the problem of intrachamber choice depicted in Figure 1, and
assume that each legislative body is homogeneous, with a unique collective
ideal policy and set of indifference curves. The point of this analysis wil be
to illustrate the significance of the quite different institutional rules gov-
erning policy formation among the two branches of the legislature and the
President. The key points for our analysis are that the House and Senate
bargain over the contents of a legislative proposal, and that the President has
veto power. We will ignore the possibility of a veto override in order to
retain simplicity in the example.
Figure 2 depicts the ideal points of the House (R), Senate (S), and Presi-




passes through Q0. The lens-shaped figure defined by points Qo, A, C, and D
defines the possible policy outcomes that are preferred by all three. Because
each has a veto (that is, the bill must pass both chambers and be signed by
the President), the new policy outcome must be located within this "lens."
Point D represents the best possible feasible outcome for the Senate, Point A
is the best that the House can do, and Point C is the most desirable feasible
outcome for the President. The half-lens defined by points A, C, and D con-
tains all possible final bills.23 The bargaining process and the strength of the
23 The proof of this assertion is as follows: (1) for any proposal outside of the triangle PHS
there are proposals inside the triangle that make all three members better off (recall that PHS
contains all Pareto optimal policies); (2) for any proposal within PHS, but outside the half-
lens, at least one member is worse off than if Qo is retained, and that member will veto the
proposal.
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three participants will determine which point within the figure ACD will be
selected. For example, if the House and Senate can convince the President
that no second bill will emerge from them if their proposal is vetoed, then
they can bargain over points along the President's indifference curve passing
through Qo (here, curve AD). However, if the President, knowing that Qo is
regarded as undesirable by the House and Senate, expects a veto to lead to a
bill closer to P, a veto threat can successfully force the House and Senate to
propose a policy near C. If none of the three participants is in a dominant
position, yet none of them is sufficiently weak to be forced to gain nothing
from the bill, some intermediate point, such as B0 , will be enacted.
Once a policy is enacted, the agency must implement it. In so doing, the
agency may shift the policy outcome away from the legislative intent (here
Bo). Two important observations can be made about the consequences of
policy drift. First, as long as the agency stays within the triangle PHS, no
legislative correction or punishment is possible. Any policy outcome within
the triangle (that is, within the Pareto optimal set) must be preferred by at
least one of the three parties to the original agreement to enact B0 . Hence,
because all three actors have a veto, one of the three will not agree to an
action that forces the agency back to Bo.24 Second, if the agency causes
policy to drift outside the triangle, all three can agree that a correction and
punishment are deserved; however, the new policy is not likely to be B0 . The
reason is that the set of feasible policies (the half-lens ACD) is uniquely
determined by the exact nature of the status quo. Hence, the agency's imple-
mented policy outcome is not likely to cause the President and the legisla-
ture to agree on B0 as the correction, unless the agency has specifically
attempted to implement the former status quo, Qo.
The issue of protecting against agency noncompliance has three compo-
nents. First, if political actors are risk averse, all three will prefer greater
certainty in policy implementation as compared to random noncompliance
(that is, noncompliance that may drift away from the preferred outcome of
each of the three). Second, each of the three wants to minimize the chance
that one of the other two will influence the agency against its interests.
Nonetheless, all have an ex post incentive to spend resources persuading the
agency to sway policy their way. This is a negative sum game, so ex ante all
three actors regard such expenditures as wasteful. Third, none of the parties
wants to let the agency choose which political actor to favor. The power to
24 Note in this situation that the President is in a more powerful position than the Congress.
By exercising the power to fire heads of agencies and to issue executive orders, the President
can influence policy without obtaining the agreement of the House and Senate. This
opportunity for effective ex post response to noncomplying behavior implies that Congress is
likely to be more concerned about structure and process tharr is the President.
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choose is the power to manipulate, holdup, and extract. Politicians would
not willingly subject themselves to such behavior by the agency.
B. Structural Constraints Placed on an Agency
The logic of the preceding argument is that the most effective means for
achieving policy stability are constraints on the flexibility of agencies, rather
than reliance on rewards, punishments, and oversight. If the agreement
within each legislative body and among the President and the two houses of
Congress can be clearly articulated in terms of policy outcomes, the best
solution is legislative specificity: writing into the law precisely what the
agency is to achieve, and how it is to do so. If the best policy from the
perspective of the winning coalition depends on arcane ififormation or is
uncertain because of frequent changes in the state of knowledge about the
problem that the policy is supposed to ameliorate, however, legislative speci-
ficity cannot identify the policy outcome that is embodied in the legisla-
tion.25 This does not mean that the agency necessarily must be free to
violate the spirit of the coalitional agreement. An alternative means of
achieving the policy outcome that the coalition would have adopted in the
absence of uncertainty is to constrain an agency's policies through its struc-
ture and process by enfranchising the constituents of each political actor-
members of Congress and the President-that is a party to the agreement to
enact policy Bo.
There are two fundamental ways in which an agency's structure and pro-
cess can influence its policy decisions. First, because policy decisions depend
upon what information is available to the agency, structure and process
determine the quantity, quality, and completeness of available information
and the extent to which policy decisions must be supported by this informa-
tion. Political principals can control the influence of a constituency by using
structure and process to affect the dependence of the agency on information
the constituency supplies.
One example is the role of agency resources in enfranchising poorly organ-
ized constituents. An agency that has sufficient resources to generate its own
information about the consequences of its decisions, available funds to subsi-
dize the participation in its processes of various poorly organized interests,
and a relatively lenient standard for judicial review of its actions (for exam-
ple, arbitrary and capricious), will be far less dependent on highly organized,
well-represented interests than an agency that lacks resources and faces a
25 See Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1
J.L. Econ. & Org. 81 (1985).
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high standard for upholding its decisions in court.26 Similarly, if cause and
effect relationships are uncertain, the assignment of the burden of proof (for
example, must a product be proven safe before marketing, as is the case with
drugs, or proven dangerous to be prevented from being marketed, as with
chemicals) will also affect the influence of different constituencies (for exam-
ple, chemical companies versus environmentalists), and hence the ultimate
policy outcome.
The second way structure and process encourage compliance is by
preventing the agency from presenting political principals with a fait accom-
pli and instead forcing it to warn them well in advance of any potentially
noncomplying decision. A common observation about administrative proce-
dures is that they cause delay by requiring agencies to follow intricate and
often cumbersome decisionmaking processes.2 7 The courts are undoubtedly
a major source of these procedures, reflecting their attempts to protect indi-
vidual rights of due process. But there is more to administrative delay than
that. Even without court-sponsored procedures, Congress and the President
typically want administrative procedures because of the political role they
play. Indeed, legislation often imposes procedural complexities that go
beyond what the courts have required.
As argued above, when an agency presents politicians with a fait accom-
pli, politicians may find it difficult, if not impossible, to respond. Legislation
can reverse the agency, but not before a new constituency is mobilized in
support of the new policy. Moreover, some members of the coalition giving
rise to the original legislation may actually prefer the agency's decision and
oppose reversing it. As long as the agency has been careful to choose a pol-
icy within the set of Pareto optimal policies, complete reversal is essentially
impossible, and only a partial correction is likely even if the new policy is not
Pareto optimal.
26 For a more complete development of these ideas, see Noll, The Political Foundations of
Regulatory Policy, in Congress: Structure and Policy 462 (1987).
27 The "problem" of delay has been much criticized by various private and government
reports. See, e.g., Federal Regulation: Roads to Reform, 1979 A.B.A. Comm'n L. & Econ. 92
(criticizing "cumbersome" administrative procedures that result in delay); Staff of Senate
Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Delay in the Regulatory Process ix (Comm.
Print 1977) (A Committee poll of about one thousand lawyers practicing regularly before eight
major commissions showed that "undue delay" was the most frequently cited major problem
with federal regulation. The Committee concluded that "[d]elay is a fundamental impediment
to the effective functioning of regulatory agencies."); The President's Advisory Council on
Executive Org., A New Regulatory Framework: Report on Selected Independent Regulatory
Agencies 5 (1971). Interestingly, none of these reports discusses why Congress and the
President have persistently ignored recommendations to end delay by streamlining regulatory
processes.
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Administrative procedures erect a barrier against an agency carrying out
such a fait accompli by forcing the agency to move slowly- and publicly,
giving politicians (informed by their constituents) time to act before the sta-
tus quo is changed. Consider, for example, the requirements of formal
rulemaking.28 Before it can issue a change in policy, an agency subject to
formal rulemaking must first announce that it is considering a policy change
and solicit the views of all relevant parties.29 Often, it is required to
announce a "provisional" rule and again solicit still more comments.3 ° In
addition, formal rulemaking requires the agency to conduct a trial-type hear-
ing, allowing interested persons to testify and to cross-examine witnesses.31
Only then can it implement a new policy by issuing the long-sought new
rule. Finally, the agency must produce a record setting forth substantial
evidence in favor of its finding and reasons for rejecting alternative
findings.32
These procedures allow politicians to prevent deviations before they
occur. 3 The members of the coalition enacting the policy can adopt a blan-
ket agreement to inhibit all possible deviations while the nature of the devia-
tion is still in doubt and the coalition has not yet formed that might support
the deviation. Delay gives the old coalition time to mobilize its constituents
before the agency undermines it by enunciating a noncomplying policy that
changes the status quo.
28 Formal rulemaking is required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) where the
agency-enabling legislation requires rules to be made "on the record after an opportunity for
an agency hearing." Administrative Procedure Act, § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982); see, e.g.,
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 301, 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1982) (procedures for formal
rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)); see also United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757 (1972) (ruling that the APA's formal
rulemaking provisions, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557, govern rulemaking proceedings only if the
agency's enabling statute, in addition to providing for a hearing, prescribes explicitly that it be
"on the record"); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) (holding that no
hearing was required under the language of the Interstate Commerce Act).
29 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (1982); see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1)-(2) (1982) (FDA
procedures).
30 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(2).
31 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d); see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(3).
32 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(e), 557(e); see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 371(c)(3).
33 Moreover, agencies are prevented from mobilizing a new constituency behind a different
policy prior to any decision. Because such actions provide clear evidence that the agency was
prejudiced and had made its "decision" prior to completing its procedures and weighing all the
evidence, they are easily reversed by the courts. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 48 (1931)
(finding that ex parte investigation and facts not put into evidence will not support an agency
order); NLRB v. A. Sartoris & Co., 140 F.2d 203, 205 (2d Cir. 1944) ("[I]f an administrative
agency ignores all the evidence given by one side in a controversy and with studied design gives
credence to the testimony of the other side, the findings would be arbitrary and not in accord
with the legal requirement.").
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One low cost route to achieving this end is by attaching appropriations
riders that prevent agencies from spending money on ongoing cases or inves-
tigations that could cause deviations from the status quo. Because appropri-
ations bills encompass large collections of specific programs, they facilitate
cooperation among politicians to thwart all deviations even though each
member might benefit from some of them.34 If numerous actions preventing
deviations are included in the same bill, the overall incentive to stabilize
policy and maintain agreements can override individual incentives on any
one issue.
To summarize, the potential for agency deviations from intended policies
that are difficult for politicians to punish or correct leads them to devise
institutions that limit an agency's ability to deviate. We have argued that
two aspects of structure and process play this role. The first creates a deci-
sional environment that causes the agency to be responsive to the constitu-
ency interests that were represented in the enacting coalition. The second
delays agency policymaking. Although costly to all, delay enables politi-
cians to act to prevent deviations while the coalitional agreement is still the
status quo.
There is an important distinction between this view of structure and pro-
cess and that emphasized in the literature about administrative law and
organizational design. Typically, the normative content of that literature
deals with achieving efficient outcomes within a process that protects the
rights of people who are likely to be affected by a policy decision. Obviously,
these issues constitute an important part of a rational political leader's prob-
lem in constructing an agency for policy implementation. Protecting consti-
tutional rights is necessary to prevent the courts from invalidating policy
and, all else equal, greater efficiency means more deliverable policy output
for affected constituents.
The theoretical arguments presented here provide a third piece of the puz-
zle of agency design. If policies are inherently conflictual, they necessarily
will produce winners and losers. An agreement to change policy is an agree-
ment to favor some constituencies over others. Hence, part of the challenge
of agency design is for the members of the coalition to use structure and
process to cause the decisions of the agency to be more responsive to the
constituencies that the policy is intended to favor and to maintain the polit-
ical compromises negotiated at the time of enactment. Specifically, we
would expect agency design to exhibit three characteristics.
34 For examples of the use of appropriations riders and informal controls through
appropriations hearings, see W. Cary, Politics and the Regulatory Agencies 35 (1967); M.
Kirst, Government Without Passing Laws 64 (1969); Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765, 775 (1983).
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First, the agency's structure and process should create a political environ-
ment that mirrors the politics at the time of enactment; that is, interests that
are active participants in the debate over the original legislation should be
given representation through the structure and process of the agency so that
each will be protected against undesirable policy drift. Specifically, the
enabling legislation should seek to combine sanctions with an institutional
structure to create pressures on agencies that replicate the political pressures
applied when the relevant legislation was enacted. Here, the point of admin-
istrative procedures is not to pre-select specific policy outcomes but to create
a decisionmaking environment that mirrors the political circumstances that
gave rise to the establishment of the policy. Although political officials may
not know what specific policy outcome they will want in the future, they will
know which interests ought to influence a decision and what distributive
outcomes will be consistent with the original coalitional arrangement.
Second, the structure and process of an agency should stack the deck in
favor of the groups who, among those significantly affected by the policy, are
also favored constituents of the coalition that caused the policy to be
adopted. And third, agency policies should exhibit an autopilot characteris-
tic in the sense that as the preferences of the constituencies enfranchised in
the agency's structure and procedure change, so too will the agency, freeing
Congress and the President from having to enact new legislation to achieve
that end.
The implication of this is not that policy is necessarily stable, but that it
will change only to the extent that either the preferences of the agency's
enfranchised constituencies change or a constituency simply withers away
and no longer takes advantage of its structural and procedural advantages.
In either case, the agency's political overseers are not likely to care about a
drift in policy. Because their preferences reflect the preferences of their con-
stituencies, the disappearance of a constituency or a change in its policy
desires will make the old policy obsolete in any case. Thus, the problem of
noncompliance is not that policy drifts, but that it drifts in ways that are
harmful to the constituents of a member of the coalition that enacted the
policy.
C. Noncompliance and the Courts
The federal courts, as well as agencies, can be a source of noncomplying
policy outcomes. Vague legislative mandates and weak standards for judi-
cial review give courts an opportunity to shape policy as they see fit. Hence,
political actors face a similar problem in trying to limit judicial decisions to
the intent of the political coalition that gave rise to the policy.
Although we have not developed a comprehensive theory of political con-
trol of the policies promulgated through judicial review, some elements of
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the theory pertaining to agencies also apply to the judiciary. Most impor-
tantly, ex post reestablishment of a coalitional agreement, after a judicial
opinion has upset the status quo, is likely to be difficult.3 5 Like an agency, a
court is safe from legislative reversal as long as its new policy is within the
Pareto optimal set established by the preferences of the House, the Senate,
and the President. As with agencies, one potential means of protecting
against judicial readjustment of policy is to use either explicit legislation or
administrative procedures in an attempt to constrain judicial decisions. The
problematic aspect, however, is precisely how judicial opinions can be con-
strained, especially those rendered by the United States Supreme Court,
where the only check upon nakedly noncomplying policymaking is legisla-
tive correction. Unlike agencies, or even lower courts, the Supreme Court
lacks an external standard for its own decisions other than legislative
response. This suggests that elected political officials are likely to be less
effective with the Supreme Court than with agencies in using ex ante con-
straints to prevent direct contravention of their policy preferences.
II. REGULATING AIR POLLUTION
The history of federal air pollution legislation provides a natural experi-
ment for illustrating and testing the ideas of Part I of this Article. Since
1955, the methods of regulating air pollution have changed many times,
including four times during the decade from 1961 through 1970.36 Impor-
tantly for our purposes, much of this revision consisted of changes in the
structure and process through which policies were developed and enforced.
Moreover, many of the policy changes in the 1970s followed court decisions
that were, arguably, unanticipated by members of the policymaking
branches. Thus, these changes exemplify the type of policy drift, as in Fig-
ure 2, that is likely to be uncorrectable by members of the legislative
coalition.
In this Part we conclude that the policy choice made by the enacting legis-
lative coalition in the 1970 Amendments was unrecoverable after the courts
intervened by requiring prevention of significant deterioration (PSD), and
that because of the structure of preferences, the courts' policy could not be
substantially amended by the policymaking branches. What remained for
members of the policymaking branches, then, was to reform the structure
and process of EPA decisionmaking to protect themselves from further
35 Marks's recent work studies in detail the problem of judicial review of legislation,
focusing on the conditions when politicians can reinstate and judicial change in policy. See B.
Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v.
Bell (Nov. 1988) (Hoover Institution Working Papers in Political Science P-88-7).
36 See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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seemingly random policy shocks. We examine some aspects of these reforms
in Part III of this Article.
The argument we make for the above conclusion takes four steps. First, in
order to identify the underlying dimensions of the policy choice, we explore
the early evolution of federal air pollution regulation. This exploration also
allows us to identify the status quo policy as of the passage of the 1970
Amendments. Second, we argue that the courts' interpretation and the sub-
sequent EPA promulgation constituted an unanticipated policy change.
Third, we identify the preferences of the members of each policymaking
branch and show how their preferences shaped their response to the court's
intervention. And fourth, we describe the nature of the new policy
equilibrium.
A. First Step: The Evolution of Federal Clean Air Policy
Two abiding policy issues have been at center stage in the history of air
pollution regulation: federalism and the tradeoff between stringency and eco-
nomic development (that is, what level of pollution will be tolerated and who
will bear the costs---established industries and areas or new industries and
undeveloped areas). The federalism question pertains to the appropriate
division of responsibilities among federal, state, and local authorities. The
core of the economic tradeoff is that, generally speaking, economic develop-
ment goes hand-in-hand with increased air pollution. Hence, if polluted
areas are to be made cleaner, the cost is some reduction in economic activity,
and if pristine areas are to remain clean, the cost is a sacrifice of some eco-
nomic growth.
Between 1955 and 1970, both issues were slowly being resolved. The
responsibility for air pollution control slowly migrated to the federal govern-
ment, reflecting a gradual evolution of the views of state and local govern-
ment officials. The latter, though by no means unanimously or
unambiguously favoring an expanded federal role, came to understand two
primary difficulties in relying on decentralized (that is, state as opposed to
federal) regulation. The first was the presence of informational economies of
scale. Key aspects of environmental regulation involve assessing the dam-
ages caused by pollution, the relationship between emissions and air quality,
and the costs of abatement. Not only is the current state of knowledge on
these issues complex and voluminous, it is also evolving rapidly. Hence, a
regulator faces a formidable task in developing and maintaining a reasonably
complete knowledge base for informing regulatory decisions. Federalization
centralizes this responsibility and avoids duplicating essentially the same
informational activities in numerous jurisdictions. Indeed, the first federal
legislation in this area, the 1955 Air Pollution Control Act, dealt exclusively
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with this problem.37
The second difficulty arising from decentralized regulation was the possi-
bility that localities would compete for industries by offering more relaxed
regulation. The problem with decentralized air pollution regulation can be
regarded as a "prisoner's dilemma" in the following sense. All localities may
prefer clean air, and if all localities simultaneously enact rigorous standards
few industries will have any incentive to relocate. But the community that
acts first may impose such sufficiently high costs on its local industries that
they close their facilities, either moving elsewhere or being displaced by com-
panies located in communities that have not yet acted.38 The two key fea-
tures of this problem are the difficulties of coordinated action and the
necessity of overcoming the incentive facing each community to be a little
more lax than the others in regulating its industries to give itself a competi-
tive edge. Federalization of regulation attacks these problems. A federal
regulator can impose regulations simultaneously on all communities and can
inflict punishments on communities that do not make reasonable efforts to
enforce these standards.3 9
The first step in federalizing regulatory authority was a modest one-the
Clean Air Act of 1963 authorized the Secretary of HEW to take legal actions
in a very limited range of circumstances.' A more significant step was
taken in 1965, when HEW was given the authority to establish national
emissions standards for automobiles."a This was only a partial assertion of
federal jurisdiction because the national standards were to be a minimum-
37 The 1955 Air Pollution Control Act authorized HEW and the Public Health Service to
conduct and sponsor scientific studies of air pollution and to coordinate information collection
to assist state and local authorities in controlling air pollution. See Air Pollution Control Act,
ch. 360, § 1, 69 Stat. 322, 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982)).
38 The argument about industry relocation is developed in Pashigian, Environmental
Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being Protected?, 23 Econ. Inquiry 551 (1985).
Pashigian shows that the political problem is even more complicated if not all localities or
regions want the same level of pollution control (e.g., if growing regions such as the Southwest
are willing to sacrifice control for growth while slow-growing or stagnant areas prefer strong
controls). Id. at 552-54.
39 To achieve this, of course, requires giving federal officials coercive powers either over
officials at other levels of government who are responsible for regulating air pollution or
directly over the sources of pollution.
40 The Secretary was authorized to take administrative or legal actions to deal with air
pollution that posed a significant threat to human health if state and local actions proved
ineffective, if the problem involved interstate pollution (after consultation with state officials),
or if the Governor of the affected state or a state air pollution agency requested help from the
Secretary. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 5(c), 77 Stat. 392, 396 (1963) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982)).
41 See Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, § 202(a), 79 Stat. 992,
992-93 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1982)).
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they did not displace any more stringent standards that might be adopted by
a state.
Shortly thereafter, the issue of nearly complete assertion of federal author-
ity was raised by President Lyndon Johnson, who in 1967 proposed that
HEW be given the authority to set national uniform emissions standards for
specific pollutants.4' Congress did not go as far as the President proposed,
but it did further federalize regulation in two ways. First, it preempted state
regulation of automobile emissions in all states except California.43 Second,
it authorized HEW to regulate air pollution in any locality when a state had
failed to do so and when pollution in the area posed a threat to public
health.44
The 1970 Amendments further reallocated responsibilities to the federal
government.4 ' By 1970, state and local government officials generally sub-
scribed to the view that centralized responsibility for setting air quality stan-
dards was desirable.46 This was largely a response on the part of state
governments to their own failure to tackle the political issues involved.
The expanding role of the federal government brought to the fore the
issues of stringency and cost. The 1970 Amendments authorized the newly
created Environmental Protection Agency to set uniform national ambient
air quality standards and emissions standards for new stationary sources of
pollutants. 47 They also authorized the EPA to set emissions standards for
both new and old sources of hazardous air pollutants.4 ' The 1970 Amend-
ments required states to adopt plans that would enable them to implement
the EPA's requirements and authorized the EPA to impose a plan on a state
that did not develop an adequate plan on its own.49 The EPA was further
empowered to take legal action against violators of its standards, leading to
fines and/or imprisonment.50 The 1970 Amendments defined new source
42 See 23 Cong. Q. Almanac 875 (1967).
43 See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 501 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (1982)); see also 23 Cong. Q. Almanac 875 (1967) ("The [Act]
provided that automobile exhaust standards could be issued only by the Federal Government,
except for California, which was permitted to enforce its own (and more stringent) control
standards. No other state was given this authority.").
44 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 81 Stat. 485, 491-97 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1982)).
45 See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 107-116, 84 Stat. 1676, 1678-
89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-7416 (1982)).
46 See 28 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 973 (1970).
47 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 109, 111, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-80,
1683-84 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7411 (1982)).
48 Id. § 112, 84 Stat. at 1685-86 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412).
49 Id. §§ 110, 113, 84 Stat. at 1680-83, 1686-87 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410,
7413).
50 Id. § 113, 84 Stat. at 1686-87 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7413).
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performance standards (NSPS) in terms of the technology required, not in
terms of emission levels. 1 They defined NSPS as a "standard for emission
of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emissions limitation achievable
through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (tak-
ing into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the [EPA] Adminis-
trator determines has been adequately demonstrated."52
Finally, the EPA was given the authority to regulate the composition of
fuels for mobile sources of pollutants if the fuels posed a threat to public
health or damaged pollution control devices.53 What remained for state and
local authorities was to write emissions standards for existing stationary
sources that achieved national air quality requirements and to enforce these
standards and the standards for new sources promulgated by the EPA.54
The slow evolution of federal regulation of air quality reflected the under-
lying politics of the period. First, the growing constituency for environmen-
tal policy put ever-increasing pressure on all levels of government to make
progress in cleaning the air. Second, improving the air required imposing
costs on sources of pollution. Moreover, because significant improvements
required that firms develop new technologies for abatement, in some cases
industry faced a fixed development cost that was unlikely to affect its pro-
duction costs and, therefore, was unlikely to be completely recovered later in
price increases or productivity advancements. Hence, significantly more
stringent environmental regulation was regarded as an unrecoverable wealth
transfer away from the owners and employees of affected industries. And if
the regulations were imposed discontinuously-in the form of a one-time
substantial cost shock-some firms could be bankrupted and some facilities
closed. Needless to say, political officials would be wary of imposing such
shocks on their constituents. Thus, the problem in designing an institution
for promulgating air pollution control policies was to make progress on the
air quality front while not disrupting local economies.
Because the policy problem was shrouded in uncertainty concerning the
costs of pollution and its abatement-including the amount of abatement
that was technologically feasible-the regulatory process would benefit from
flexibility in responding to new information. But with flexibility comes the
possibility of noncomplying behavior by either of two sets of regulators: the
federal officials promulgating national standards or the state and local offi-
51 Id. § 111(a)(1), 84 Stat. at 1683 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1)).
52 Id.
53 Id. § 211(c)(1), 84 Stat. at 1698-99 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)).
5 Id. § 110, 84 Stat. at 1680-83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410); see also H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 5374, 5377-78 (report accompanying H.R. 17,255 describing the states' role in the
adoption and enforcement of implementation plans).
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cials making and enforcing implementation plans. Hence, capturing the
benefits of flexibility while minimizing the risk of noncompliance required
the development of a process that would prevent both a drift away from
progress toward cleaner air and disruption of local economies.
B. Second Step: Policy Innovation by the Courts
and the Evolution of PSD
Soon after the passage of the 1970 Amendments, the EPA promulgated
regulations regarding degradation of air quality in areas with clean air."5
The EPA concluded that the intent of Congress was for the agency to estab-
lish a uniform nationwide air quality standard that would not require a strict
rule against degradation of air quality in pristine regions.56 The Sierra Club
appealed this decision to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, which eventually ruled that the EPA had to reject state imple-
mentation plans (SIPs) that did not prevent the degradation of air quality in
clean air regions. 7 The ruling caused the EPA to reinstate the nondegrada-
tion policies it had previously discarded. Because of the ruling, the EPA
replaced the uniform national ambient air quality standards it had promul-
gated pursuant to the 1970 Amendments with a multiplicity of standards
based not on health or welfare considerations but on each region's actual air
quality.5 8
The legislative history of the 1970 Amendments provides scant basis for
believing that Congress intended the EPA to promulgate rules to prevent
significant deterioration. Judge Pratt of the District of Columbia District
Court based his Sierra Club ruling on five items in the legislative history of
the 1970 Amendments,59 of which only two were actually legislative in ori-
gin, and of these two only one actually preceded the 1970 Amendments. 60
In his decision, Judge Pratt referred to a sentence in the 1970 report of the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (Senate Public Works
Committee) stating that the EPA should disapprove SIPs for clean air areas
that did not "provide, to the maximum extent practicable, for the continued
55 See National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 50
(1972); Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 40
C.F.R. § 51.
56 These views were encapsulated in a regulation promulgated by the EPA in the wake of
the 1970 Amendments requiring only that states not allow air degradation to rise above
applicable secondary standards. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.12(b).
57 Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
58 R. Melnick, supra note 11, at 71.
59 344 F. Supp. at 255.
60 For an excellent discussion of the legislative history relied on in the Sierra Club litigation,
see R. Melnick, supra note 11, at 76-80.
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maintenance of such ambient air quality., 61 This language could be inter-
preted as implying PSD, but the report went on to state:
Once such national goals are established, deterioration of air quality
should not be permitted except under circumstances where there is no
available alternative. Given the various alternative means of prevent-
ing and controlling air pollution-including the use of the best avail-
able control technology, industrial processes, and operating
practices-and care in the selection of sites for new sources, land use
planning and traffic controls-deterioration need not occur.62
A more reasonable interpretation of this passage is that the Senate Public
Works Committee did not intend to prevent degradation of clean air areas,
but rather intended to require polluters to use the "best available control
technology" (BACT).6 3 This interpretation would also be consistent with
other discussions of the 1970 Amendments in the report.
Had Congress intended a nondegtadation policy, one would expect that
the legislative response to Sierra Club would have been a relatively noncon-
troversial one, featuring at best a few perfecting changes in legislation or
some discussions of the details in oversight hearings. Instead, the debate
about PSD continued for five years before a very detailed set of PSD rules
was finally enacted as a compromise between very different bills passed by
the House and Senate." It is thus reasonable to conclude that the court's
decision was a policy innovation that was unanticipated by the policymaking
branches.
L Implementation of PSD
In the absence of strict guidelines from either the court65 or Congress, the
EPA responded to the ruling in Sierra Club by promulgating regulations to
61 Sierra Club, 344 F. Supp. at 255 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1970)).
62 S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970) (emphasis added).
63 For example, the Senate bill proposed that new stationary sources be "designed, built,
equipped, operated, and maintained so as to reduce emissions to a minimum." The
performance standards were to be met through the "application of the latest available emission
control technology or through other means of preventing or controlling air pollution." Id. at
15-16.
64 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 160-178, 91 Stat. 685,
731-51 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7508 (1982)). Compare S. 252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
123 Cong. Rec. 18,517 (1977) with H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 16,966
(1977).
65 Indeed, as Melnick points out, the court failed to define what constitutes "significant"
deterioration. See R. Melnick, supra note 11, at 77.
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prevent significant deterioration.66 These regulations incorporated three
basic features.
First, the EPA defined significant deterioration and established guidelines
for the development and submittal of SIPs with respect to PSD. In no
instance did the proposed rules define significant deterioration in terms other
than concentrations of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter.67 Further, the
determination of what actually constituted significant deterioration was left
to the states under this promulgation, with the EPA Administrator retaining
the authority to assess whether they conformed to the federal standard.68
Second, the EPA provided for the designation of air quality areas under
three classifications: class I applied to "areas in which practically any change
in air quality would be considered significant"; class II applied to "areas in
which deterioration normally accompanying moderate well-controlled
growth would be considered insignificant"; and class III applied to "areas in
which deterioration up to the national [ambient air quality] standards would
be considered insignificant., 69 The proposed regulations specified the allow-
able increments in pollutant concentrations over baseline air quality concen-
trations for class I and class II regions. Areas designated as class III were
limited to concentrations of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide no greater
than the national ambient air quality standards.7" The deterioration incre-
ments in class I and II areas were established by emissions ceilings that
could not be exceeded by any new major source. The determination of
allowable air quality increments permitted reductions of emissions from
existing sources to be taken into account in determining the unused portion
of the allowable air quality increment. 71 States could reclassify areas, sub-
ject to EPA review and approval, to allow for the introduction of sources not
otherwise compatible with the initial classification if the resulting deteriora-
tion would not be significant.72 EPA approval of proposed redesignations
would be based on the record of the state's hearings.73
Third, the EPA modified the review procedures for new polluting sources
by adding considerable detail to the NSPS requirements. New sources,
wherever located, would be reviewed to determine their impact on air qual-
66 See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1975).
67 Id. § 52.21(c)(2).
68 Id. § 52.02.
69 Environmental Protection Agency Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans:
Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,999, 31,003 (1974) (EPA
Administrator's Aug. 15, 1974 introduction to proposed changes to 40 C.F.R. § 52.21).
70 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (1975).
7' Id. § 52.21(d)(2)(i)-(ii).
72 Id. § 52.21(c)(3)(ii).
73 Id. § 52.21(c)(3)(ii)(d).
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ity. Preconstruction review would be applied to proposed facilities in
nineteen specific major source categories.74 The list of sources subject to
review was expanded to include two additional source types: fuel conversion
plants and primary lead smelters.75 The regulations further specified that no
construction or modification of new sources could commence unless the
EPA Administrator determined that the effect on air quality would not lead
to a violation of air quality increments.76 All new or modified sources were
required to meet an emissions limit representing the level of emissions reduc-
tion achieved by the application of BACT.7 7 In determining whether the
new source met the BACT requirement, the EPA Administrator would con-
sider fuels and raw materials available, the respective costs of the application
of new control techniques, process changes, or alternative fuels, and any
applicable state and local emissions limitations.78
A source that was modified but did not increase pollution other than sul-
fur oxides or particulate matter, or was modified to utilize an alternative
fuel, was not subject to the new regulations. This provision exempted modi-
fications of such sources as coal cleaning plants, pulp mills; cement plants,
primary zinc smelters, iron and steel mills, primary aluminum ore reduction
plants, and primary copper smelters from the requirements of the regula-
tion.79 As a general rule, though, the EPA disapproved SIPs that did not
prevent "significant deterioration of air quality in any portion of any State
where the existing air quality is better than the national ambient air quality
standards. ' 0
In effect, the regulations promulgated by the EPA required that air qual-
ity not be allowed to deteriorate, even if the air quality of a region greatly
exceeded national standards. Except in areas with especially bad air quality,
established sources generally were not required to achieve as great a degree
of emissions abatement as new sources. State implementation plans for
nonattainment areas were required to establish regulatory strategies for
existing sources so that an air quality region could achieve national stan-
dards. New sources were required to adopt the best possible control tech-
nologies. Moreover, in nonattainment areas they were further required to
abate other existing sources so that the net effect of the construction of new
74 Id. § 52.21(d)(1)(i)-(xix).
75 Id. § 52.21(d)(1)(xvii)-(xviii).
76 Id. § 52.21(d)(2)(i).
77 Id. § 52.21(d)(2)(ii). In this case, BACT was defined to mean "any emission control
device or technique which is capable of limiting emissions to the levels proposed or
promulgated." Id. § 52.01(f). Where no standards of performance existed, BACT was to be
determined on a case-by-case basis considering six enumerated factors. Id.
78 Id. § 52.01(f)(1), (4), (5).,
79 Id. § 52.21(d)(1)(i)-(vii).
so Id. § 52.21(a).
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sources and abatement of existing sources was an improvement in air qual-
ity. In both PSD regions and nonattainment areas, NSPS were required;
however, in PSD regions a new source did not necessarily have to abate
other sources to achieve zero net emissions. But to escape the zero (or close
to zero) net emissions requirement, the owner of the new source had to show
that the proposed new facility would not cause a significant deterioration of
air quality.81
C. Third Step: The Political Response to the Court
The court's ruling in Sierra Club, together with the EPA's interpretation
of the court's requirements in its promulgated regulations, established a new
status quo policy.8 2 Here we explore the logic of the proposition that Con-
gress was blindsided by the court on the PSD issue and examine whether
subsequent developments are consistent with this proposition. If PSD was a
surprise, its effect was an unanticipated movement from a legislative policy
agreement (Bo in figures 1 and 2) to some new status quo point. Here the
source of the movement was judicial policymaking, not agency noncompli-
ance. Implicit in this account is that the EPA was correct when it concluded
that it lacked legislative authority to develop PSD rules.
Further, if the court's change in policy is also in the set of Pareto optimal
outcomes, no significant changes in this policy can be enacted because each
institutional actor holds a veto power over proposed changes in the status
quo. Thus, the subsequent legislative enactment of basically the same PSD
requirements that emerged from the court and the EPA's subsequent
rulemaking provides no evidence that PSD was the original intention of Con-
gress in 1970.83
1. The Preferences of the Players
To shed further light on the PSD issue requires that we examine the policy
preferences of the important actors involved in forging the 1970 Amend-
ments. To do so, we examine not only the specific issue of PSD but also the
passage of the 1970 Amendments that were determined by the court to
require PSD, and Congress's legislative response in 1976 and 1977 to the
adoption of PSD.
81 Id. § 52.21(d).
82 Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); see 40 C.F.R. § 52
(1975).
83 This conclusion parallels Marks's exploration of what kinds of inferences can be drawn
about politicians' preferences and intentions based on their subsequent reactions to judicial
changes in policy. See Marks, supra note 35.
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The incentives of political actors are forged through the electoral connec-
tion.8 4 Different politicians confront different reelection problems,"5 so their
incentives and actions will be shaped somewhat differently. Indeed, this was
the intent of the Constitutional Convention in creating different electoral
systems-different constituencies and different terms of office-for Con-
gressmen, Senators, and the President. By giving the members of the poli-
cymaking branches somewhat different ties to the people, the founding
fathers sought to ensure that the theoretical separation of powers was main-
tained in practice.8 6
The differences in constituencies and terms of office among elected officials
are likely to cause several types of differences in their concerns about poli-
cies. First, all else equal, smaller constituencies generally have less diversity
of interest and enterprise. This implies that representatives with smaller
constituencies are more likely to see an issue in terms of a single overriding
interest. Thus, House members are more likely to be spokesmen for certain
industries or groups than Senators whose constituencies are, with a few
exceptions, larger than those represented by House members from their
states. Because Senators face larger constituencies and have more media
attention (and because many of them aspire to the Presidency), they are
more likely to be worried about national goals and the larger picture rather
than specific industries. Smaller states are likely to be less diversified, so
their Senators are more likely to be champions of a single interest. The Pres-
ident, representing a national constituency, will be the least tied to specific
industries, groups, or sectors.
Second, the shorter term for members of the House implies that they will
apply a higher discount rate than will the President or Senators when con-
sidering the long-term costs and benefits of government policy. Because
House members are essentially continuously standing for reelection, they are
more likely to favor programs that have immediate payoffs and delayed
costs.
In order to evaluate the positions of members of the House and Senate and
of the President, we need to identify the underlying dimensions of the PSD
84 This line of argument is now standard in the political science literature on Congress. See,
e.g., R. Fenno, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts 171-213 (1978) (suggesting how
members of Congress first build, then maintain, a "reliable reelection constituency"); M.
Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment 39 (1977) (asserting that "the
primary goal of the typical congressman is reelection"); D. Mayhew, supra note 22, at 5 (1974)
(describing United States Congressmen as "single-minded seekers of reelection").
85 They face different districts with different primary and reelection constituencies. Because
of this, their relationships with their constituents will differ and the actions they take will be
predictably different. See R. Fenno, supra note 84, at 1-29.
86 See The Federalist No. 39, at 254-55 (J. Madison) (C. Van Doren ed. 1945).
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tradeoff. The two dimensions are who is to bear the costs of air pollution
regulation and the magnitude of the environmental benefits. This translates
into how much of the cost is to be imposed on established firms and how
much is to be born by new enterprises and undeveloped areas, together with
how stringent the requirements will be.
The position of the President is most difficult to determine ex post because
he was less involved in the legislative process. Because of their national con-
stituency, Presidents are inclined to be more concerned about economic effi-
ciency and less about protecting specific industries. In the case of air
pollution legislation, this suggests that the President will pay less attention
to the relocational aspects of environmental regulation, and more to mini-
mizing the costs of achieving a given policy objective.
President Nixon was relatively favorably inclined toward environmental
regulation, having created the EPA through a Reorganization Plan87 and
having proposed much of the ultimate contents of the 1970 Amendments.88
Under Nixon, however, the EPA rejected PSD in 1971. No doubt this
reflected the President's view, for the EPA decision was not followed by an
executive proposal to correct the issue in the Clean Air Act so that PSD
rules could be promulgated. Indeed, the Nixon Administration's response to
the court ruling was to propose an amendment to the Clean Air Act elimi-
nating the PSD requirement.89 It seems reasonable to conclude that Nixon
favored somewhat looser overall environmental regulation than that favored
by the median (Democratic) member of Congress, but did not favor the elab-
orate use of air pollution regulation to preserve the existing pattern of indus-
trial development, especially at high cost.
The preferences of relevant House and Senate actors are somewhat easier
to discern. The arguments presented in Part I of this Article lead us to begin
with an examination of the policy preferences of the oversight committees in
both chambers, for congressional rules of procedure give them considerable
influence in determining the ultimate legislative outcome.90 In the House of
87 Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1132
(1982), and in 84 Stat. 2086-87 (1972).
88 See The President's Message on the Environment, Feb. 10, 1970, 116 Cong. Rec. 32,908.
89 See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,509, 42,510 (1974) ("The Administration has submitted for
consideration an amendment to the Act which would eliminate the requirement for preventing
significant deterioration of air quality.").
90 The influence of committees is standard wisdom in congressional literature. See D.
Mayhew, supra note 22, at 85-97. The powers underlying this influence include the following
three procedures: (1) the monopoly right, held by the oversight committee, to introduce
legislation (i.e., a first-mover advantage); (2) the right of committee members to revise
amendments proposed by members not on the committee; and (3) the practice of populating
conference committees with members of the committees that have jurisdiction over the bill.
These rules give committees two vetoes over legislative actions--one prior to legislative
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Representatives, jurisdiction over environmental legislation resides in the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (House Commerce Com-
mittee). The responsibilities of this committee include oversight of many
regulatory agencies and the Department of Commerce. In both 1970 and
1977 its Chairman was Harley 0. Staggers (Democrat, West Virginia). It is
hardly surprising, then, that the House has been steadfast in using NSPS for
electric utilities to protect the West Virginia coal industry.
The overall membership of the House Commerce Committee exhibits two
additional features. Historically, it has been rather pro-business, having had
oversight responsibilities for the host of regulatory agencies that gave rise to
the capture-cartel theory of regulation, 91 and most of its members have been
from industrialized, populous states. Of the thirty-six members in 1970,
fourteen were from the industrial Northeast and Midwest and four more
were from eastern coal-mining states. In addition, five were from California
or Texas, sunbelt states with serious urban air pollution problems.9 2 By
1977, the House Commerce Committee was even more unbalanced: twenty-
two of its forty-three members were from the industrial Northeast and Mid-
west, three more were from eastern coal areas, and nine were from Califor-
nia or Texas. 93 Thus, approximately two-thirds in 1970 and three-fourths in
1977 of the oversight committee members could be expected to be deeply
concerned about the economic dislocation effects of air pollution regulation.
For the entire House, concern for protecting specialized local economies is
likely to be strong. Conversely, long-term policies, with costs now but bene-
fits down the road, are likely to be less popular in the House than in the
Senate. Hence, the propensity of the oversight committee to be concerned
about established industries, though more targeted on traditional manufac-
turing than the House as a whole, would likely be broadly consistent with
the general inclinations of all House members. From these observations, it is
consideration and one afterwards in conference. These vetoes offer committee members special
advantages. For a discussion of the effects of these rules, see Shepsle & Weingast, The
Institutional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 85 (1987).
91 In contrast to the traditional view that bureaus attempt to serve the general welfare are
theories that view bureaus as servants of well-defined interests, either because they were set up
to serve specific clients (the cartel theory), or because, through the years, they become
vulnerable to being taken over by some special interest (the capture theory). For a survey of
capture-cartel theories, see Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidisciplinary
Survey and Synthesis, in Regulatory Policy and The Social Sciences 9, 24-28 (R. Noll ed.
1985).
92 This was somewhat counterbalanced in 1977 because Senator Malcolm Wallop of
Wyoming (a major site of western coal) was on the Public Works Committee's Subcommittee
on Environmental Pollution. See 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News lxxxv.
93 See 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News cxiii.
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likely that the idea of PSD was congenial to members of the House in both
1970 and 1977.
In the Senate, jurisdiction over environmental policy resides in the Senate
Public Works Committee. The jurisdiction of this committee is wholly dif-
ferent from that of its House counterpart, for public works is a traditional
federal pork barrel. Its primary task is to authorize federal construction
projects like rivers, harbors, and reclamation. Because these programs are
especially important in less populated states, the membership of the Senate
Public Works Committee differs from that of the House Commerce
Committee.
In 1970, only four of the fifteen members of the Senate Public Works
Committee were from the industrial Northeast and Midwest (counting Sena-
tor Thomas Eagleton of Missouri-a debatable classification), and none were
from California or Texas. Its main point of commonality with the member-
ship of the House Commerce Committee was eastern coal: three Senators
represented eastern coal states, including the Chairman, again from West
Virginia, Jennings Randolph. Among the remainder of the Senate Public
Works Committee were members from Maine, New Mexico, Alaska, Kan-
sas, and Oregon, states with at best minor problems with air pollution from
industrial sources; and from Virginia, Florida, and North Carolina, sunbelt
states with some track record of attracting new industry away from the
Northeast.94 By 1977, membership on the committee had shifted even fur-
ther away from northeastern influence. Although Randolph was still Chair-
man, only two of the fifteen members represented eastern coal, and only two
members were from the industrial Northeast. Largely rural states had a
clear majority, with nine members from the following states: Maine, Ver-
mont, Alaska, North Dakota, Iowa, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, and
Wyoming.
95
It is difficult to imagine that a committee with this composition would
have strongly favored protecting eastern manufacturing industries; only
Randolph's position as Chairman makes it plausible that the Senate Public
Works Committee favored protecting eastern coal. 9 6 Indeed, its member-
ship and jurisdiction indicate that the committee would have preferred eco-
nomic development in clean air areas rather than a strict PSD policy.
The Senate as a body differs from the House in two important ways. First,
in comparison with the House, the Senate overrepresents the sparsely popu-
lated states of the Great Plains and the West 9 7 -the kinds of states that
94 See 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News cxvii.
95 See 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News xc.
96 See 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News lxxxv.
97 Relative to the House, malapportionment in the Senate is extreme. For example, a
Senator from California represents over fifty times as many voters as a Senator from Wyoming.
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favor federal development projects and that are the mainstay of the Senate
Public Works Committee. Second, in most states, Senators have a more
diversified constituency and so are less responsive to the needs of particular
industries. In addition, their longer terms politically enable Senators to take
a longer view of the benefits and costs of policy actions. On balance, these
factors make the Senate somewhat less inclined to stress stringent regulation
of air quality in relatively less polluted areas, and less inclined to worry
about possible adverse effects of the regulation on specific plants and indus-
tries. To the extent the latter issue was important, the Senate would be less
inclined to favor using environmental regulation to keep traditional manu-
facturing industries in the Northeast.
The implication of this analysis is that the Senate would not have been
likely to have sought PSD rules in 1970. It is unlikely that members of the
upper chamber would have favored a policy that sacrificed opportunities for
pollution control in nonattainment areas in order to use environmental regu-
lation to slow the relocation of industry. Thus, although the Senate might
have been inclined to go along with nationwide NSPS, it would not have
been inclined to favor tough PSD rules because it represented a long-term
commitment to cleaner air everywhere.
2. Some Evidence on Preferences
The conjectured preferences for the two chambers of Congress and the
President described above are sufficient to yield a single rank-ordering over
the two issues involved in the legislation. With respect to allocating the
costs of regulation, the members of the House, on average, would be
expected to prefer to place more of the burden on new industry. Their Sen-
ate counterparts would be less inclined to sacrifice growth for the benefit of
established firms, and the President would be even less so inclined. Within
each chamber, eastern and Great Lakes representatives, on average, should
prefer to burden new firms to a greater extent than would members from the
West and Southwest.
With respect to stringency, members of the House, on average, represent
more urban (and therefore more polluted) areas and so would be expected to
favor more stringent regulations than the average member of the upper
chamber, who in turn is more inclined toward stringent regulation than the
President. This conjecture is somewhat controversial as it has often been
assumed that it was the Senate rather than the House of Representatives that
sought tougher environmental legislation. The median Senators, however,




represent clean air areas. This implies that stringent regulation does them
little good and may in fact impede growth in their states.
Before proceeding with our analysis we need to define stringency more
carefully. In practice, stringency is a complex concept. One aspect is the
number of pollutants regulated, and the criteria for establishing maximum
concentrations of each. Here we regard a policy as more stringent if it regu-
lates more pollutants or adopts more rigorous criteria for setting ambient air
quality standards. In addition, stringency has both a shortrun and longrun
aspect. Because of the costs to established firms, members of the House gen-
erally preferred to delay stringent regulation (and thus delay or evade the
costs to old plants), whereas Senators were more likely to prefer results
sooner rather than later. But the House sought greater longrun stringency.
The standards it adopted, though taking a longer time to become effective,
would eventually result in cleaner air than those proposed by the Senate. In
this sense, we regard the House as favoring more stringent standards.
Stringency is determined not only by the standards enacted, but also by
technical and arcane definitions of the technology required (for example,
"best available technology" versus "continuous emissions reduction"). Fur-
ther, requirements to take into account the costs of proposed regulations, or
to consider alternative means of accomplishing an end, affect the ability of
the EPA Administrator to promulgate stringent regulations, at least in the
short run. Provisions allowing for exemptions and waivers also reduce strin-
gency by limiting the applicability of standards. Thus, comparing the pro-
posals offered in each chamber involves an examination of much more than
just the substantive definitions of the standards so often discussed in the
literature.
An examination of the proposals and amendments to the Clean Air Act
offered in each chamber in the 1970s confirm these conjectures. The amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act offered in the House in 1970 were contained in
H.R. 17,255; 98 the Senate's amendments were presented in S. 4358. 99 In
comparing these two bills, three differences are apparent.
The first major difference pertains to the comparative treatment of old and
new sources. The House proposed to protect against the relocation of
existing plants and would have sheltered existing firms from severe cost bur-
dens. For all practical purposes, the House sought to exempt old sources
from regulation, while subjecting new sources to stringent control. 1° ° To
this end, the House bill required that any new source be designed and
equipped to prevent and control emissions to the fullest extent compatible
98 H.R. 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 Cong. Ree. 19,224 (1970).
99 S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
100 H.R. 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5, 116 Cong. Rec. 19,225 (1970).
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with "the available technology and economic feasibility."'' In interpreting
this condition, the report of the House Commerce Committee stated that the
promulgation of federal emissions standards for new sources would "pre-
clude efforts on the part of States to compete with each other in trying to
attract new plants and facilities without assuring adequate control of
extrahazardous or large-scale emissions therefrom."' 2 The Senate was less
insistent about the technology used and instead defined new source perform-
ance standards in terms similar to national ambient air quality standards. 103
The technology bias of the House, of course, illustrates its members' desire
to prevent industrial relocation.
A second difference between the chambers was their treatment of eco-
nomic considerations in setting standards. For example, the House explic-
itly required the EPA to consider the costs of proposed pollution control
techniques in setting national ambient air quality standards"° and NSPS, °5
whereas the Senate left cost considerations implicit in setting national stan-
dards and deemphasized such considerations in NSPS.106 Environmentalists
have generally fought the consideration of costs in setting standards, so this
difference forms the basis for the belief that the Senate bill was more
stringent.
The Senate and House differed in another way that offset the differences
over cost considerations. This third difference pertains to the structure and
process of standard-setting. The House proposed to delegate far greater dis-
cretion to the EPA than the Senate; the House also proposed a mechanism
for more effective, and thus more stringent, regulation than would have
emerged under the Senate proposal. Whereas the House proposed to dele-
gate the authority to make almost every decision to the Administrator, 10 7
the Senate proposed to delegate numerous decisions to others. For example,
the Senate sought to delegate authority to grant exemptions for implementa-
tion plans to the President10 8 and to the courts. 0 9 By creating more veto
points, the Senate gave opponents of stringent standards a greater likelihood
of both delay and success.
101 Id., 116 Cong. Rec. 19,226.
102 H.R. Rep. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5356, 5358.
103 S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1970).
104 See H.R. 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5, 116 Cong. Rec. 19,225 (1970).
105 Id. § 5, 116 Cong. Ree. 19,225.
106 S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1970).
107 H.RL 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, 116 Cong. Ree. 19,224 (1970).
108 S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 7 (1970).
109 Id. § 6.
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The Senate also was more detailed, and hence more constraining, in its
definition of the Administrator's duties. For example, the Senate proposed
that the EPA establish air quality standards for three categories of pollu-
rants11 whereas the House offered no such restriction. Moreover, the
House left open the means by which new sources were to comply with
national standards, calling for the lowest possible emissions given cost effi-
ciency, and thereby giving more flexibility to the Administrator.111 The Sen-
ate wanted NSPS to be met through the application of the best available
emissions control technology.1 12
Finally, the Senate proposed many more ways in which states or sources
could exempt themselves from the requirements of the Clean Air Act or
waive the implementation of standards, at least temporarily. The Senate
would have allowed state implementation plans to contain less rigorous stan-
dards than the national standards for up to three years, 113 whereas no such
escape was allowed in the House bill. The House proposed that the Admin-
istrator be permitted some limited discretion to exempt new facilities from
compliance for reasons of public health, research, or national security or, in
the case of federal facilities, if determined to be in the "paramount interest of
the United States." '114 The Senate, however, would have allowed the Admin-
istrator to grant extensions,11 ' the President to exempt federal facilities,116
and governors to petition the courts for exemptions. 117 The Senate would
have also allowed waivers if the Secretary found that the source had
achieved maximum air pollution control using the best available technol-
ogy."' Relief could be obtained from the courts when substantial effort
could be shown. 9
Taken together, the greater burden imposed by the Senate on the Admin-
istrator, the more limited authority given the Administrator, and the greater
ability for others to grant exemptions and waivers of the standards estab-
110 Id. §§ 5-6 (including agents covered by air quality criteria that affect public welfare,
agents emitted by stationary sources, and agents that "available material evidence indicates are
hazardous to the health of persons").
InI H.R. 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 5, 116 Cong. Rec. 19,225 (1970); see H.R. Rep. No.
1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 10, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5356,
5358, 5365-66.
112 S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16.
113 Compare S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1970) with H.R. 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 4, 116 Cong. Rec. 19,225 (1970).
114 H.R. 17,255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 5, 10, 116 Cong. Rec. 19,225, 19,228.
115 S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1970).
116 Id. § 7.
117 Id. § 6.
11 Id.; see S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58.
119 S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1970).
[Vol. 75:431
Political Control of Agencies
lished by the Administrator lead us to conclude that the Senate sought a less
stringent air pollution policy. The effect of the Senate provisions was to
make it more difficult for the EPA to implement stringent policies
effectively. 120
3. The Congressional Response to Policy Innovation
During 1976 and 1977, both the House and the Senate considered numer-
ous responses to the PSD policy that the EPA promulgated in 1974. The
actions they ultimately chose reflect the preferences we conjectured on the
basis of electoral considerations. The aspects of the House proposals in 1976
and 1977 that provided a measure of protection for existing firms, particu-
larly manufacturing firms in the Northeast and Midwest, are well-docu-
mented elsewhere,121 and we will not review them here. Our focus is on the
differences between the policy preferences of the House and Senate as
revealed in the bills each produced in these years. In general the House bills
proposed PSD regulations that were more stringent than those the Senate
produced.
In 1976, the House and Senate bills offered different definitions of PSD.
Both chambers defined PSD in relation to the maximum allowable incre-
ments of pollution over baseline concentrations for each designated control
region, but differed over which pollutants would be subject to PSD require-
ments and how those requirements would be met. In the House, increments
were established for all pollutants for which there existed a national ambient
air quality standard.'22 The EPA was to implement this by requiring stan-
dards of performance that reflected "the degree of emission reduction
achievable through the application of the best technological system of con-
tinuous emission reduction."' 23 The Senate, however, specified deterioration
increments only for sulfur oxides and particulates, and recommended that
these standards be met through the relatively weaker requirement of the
"best available control technology."' 2 4 Continuous emissions reduction is a
more stringent requirement than BACT in two respects: first, the continuous
emissions reduction requirement was meant to forbid intermittent nonattain-
120 Cf. McCubbins, The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure, 29 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 721
(1985) (examining the manner in which substantive discretionary authority available to an
administrative agency is fashioned through the scope of regulatory activities granted to the
agency, the instrumentality by which the agency can implement its policy choices, and the
procedures required for agency decisionmaking).
121 See B. Ackerman & W. Hassler, supra note 11, at 29-57.
122 See H.R. 10,498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 108(a), 122 Cong. Rec. 30,780 (1976).
123 Id. § 111, 122 Cong. Rec. 30,784.
124 S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6, 122 Cong. Rec. 30,763 (1976).
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ment by sources even for short periods of time; second, it was not restricted
to "available" technology.
As in the regulations the EPA promulgated in 1974, the House bill speci-
fied three classes of clean air areas subject to PSD. Class I included national
parks and wilderness areas, and class II encompassed all other attainment
areas.125 The states could also designate (or redesignate) some areas as class
III, which were to be clean air areas in which industrial development would
be permitted and in which air quality levels would be allowed to deteriorate
to the national standard. 12 6 But before doing so, the states were required to
give notice and to hold public hearings.127
The 1976 Senate proposal specified only two classes of attainment areas.
Like the House bill, class I included parks and wilderness areas and class II
included all remaining areas."' But the Senate bill rejected the policy
promulgated by the EPA and accepted by the House that some clean air
areas should be set aside for industrial development where deterioration to
the national standard would be allowed, as in the proposed class III areas in
the House bill. The Senate Public Works Committee report stated that the
wording of the Senate bill was intended to reject the policy that class I areas
should remain pristine. Western Senators with large fractions of their states
contained in national parks and wilderness areas continually sought to rede-
fine and weaken the class I definitions. 29
The House allowed for compliance date extensions in its rules, but the
Senate, as in the 1970 Amendments, allowed for many more exemptions and
waivers. x3 Further, the House imposed somewhat tighter procedural
requirements for granting waivers-the EPA Administrator could grant
compliance date extensions only with notice and a public hearing "on the
record," and the governor of the affected state was given the power to veto
such actions.13 1
In its report accompanying the Senate bill,13 2 the Senate Public Works
Committee stated that its intent was to restrict the EPA's role in preventing
significant deterioration.1 33 Its proposal was to limit the EPA's role in
125 H.R. 10,498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 108(a), 122 Cong. Rec. 30,781 (1976).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6, 122 Cong. Rec. 30,763 (1976).
129 S. Rep. No. 717, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976).
130 Compare H.R. 10,498 §§ 103(a), 106(a), 112, 202, 122 Cong. Rec. 30,776, 30,778,
30,785, 30,787 (1976) with S. 3219 §§ 7(a), 9(a), 15, 122 Cong. Rec. 30,764-65, 30,768 (1976).
131 H.R. 10,498 § 103(a), 122 Cong. Rec. 30,776 (1976); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1742,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 90-91 (1976) (discussing the compliance date extension procedures
contained in the House bill).
132 S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 Cong. Rec. 30,763 (1976).
133 S. Rep. No. 717, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976).
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implementing a new PSD policy to: (1) approving the new source review
established by the state;' 34 (2) seeking injunctive relief or other measures
necessary to prevent the issuance of a permit for new sources that did not
comply with air quality requirements; 35 (3) resolving interstate disputes; 136
and (4) notifying a state when it believed an adverse impact might occur in a
class I area. 137 In essence, the EPA's role was restricted to assuring compli-
ance with the law. Lastly, the Senate proposed to transfer the authority to
grant exemptions for coal conversion from the EPA to the Federal Energy
Administration, presumably to reduce the influence of environmental policy
on the granting of exemptions while increasing the importance of energy
policy. 138
The conference committee appointed in 1976 to reconcile the two bills
accepted all of the amendments to the 1970 Clean Air Act that each house
offered individually, and compromised on all amendments over which the
two houses differed. 131 The conference accepted the Senate's weaker defini-
tion for class I areas," while also adopting the House proposal to allow the
redesignation of areas to class III."' The conference settled on the Senate's
plan to implement BACT but accepted many of the House's procedural
demands and all of the proposed exemptions of both chambers. Despite
these modifications, the bill failed to pass.14
In 1977, both chambers proposed bills similar to their 1976 proposals.
The House, however, proposed regulations even more stringent than they
had the year before. They added nitrogen dioxide to the list of pollutants
subject to national standards, 4 3 added "visibility" as a criterion for setting
standards in class I areas,'" and placed additional burdens and standards of
proof on new sources in meeting compliance requirements. 145




138 S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 15(b)(7), 122 Cong. Rec. 30,768 (1976).
139 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 85-125; see also 122 Cong. Rec.
34,380-88 (1976) (statement of the bill's floor manager, Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine,
summarizing the conference report provisions).
140 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1976).
141 Id.
142 The Senate attempted to take up consideration of the conference report on the final day
of the 94th Congress, but did not reach a final vote on the agreement. See 122 Cong. Rec.
34,415-17 (1976).
143 H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 1077, 1119.
144 Id. at 13, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 1090-91.
145 Id. at 190, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 1268-69.
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By contrast, the 1977 Senate proposal sought less stringent requirements
than those of their relatively weaker 1976 proposal. For example, the Senate
sought to exempt small polluters. 146 Ultimately, the provisions of the con-
ference report for these sections were much the same as in 1976, and in the
end, although both chambers proposed significant changes, the final legisla-










D. Fourth Step: The New Equilibrium
The inference to be drawn from this discussion of the history of the Clean
Air Act between 1970 and 1977 is as follows. If the relative positions of the
House, Senate, and President are as described, and if the 1970 Amendments
were not intended to produce PSD, the 1972 court decision in Sierra Club v.
Ruckelshaus 4 7 upset a policy equilibrium. The consequences of this unan-
ticipated change in policy can be illustrated by returning to our simple two
dimensional model of policy choice. The preferences just established for
each institutional actor are illustrated in Figure 3. The House favors greater
146 Compare S. 252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, 123 Cong. Rec. 18,517 (1977) with S. 3219,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6, 122 Cong. Rec. 30,763 (1976) (providing for a small polluter
exemption). Consideration of the Senate bill (S. 252) was indefinitely postponed early in the
95th Congress, and the House bill (H.R. 6161) was passed in lieu of that Senate bill. See Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
147 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub nom.
Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
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stringency than the Senate favors, which in turn favors more stringent regu-
lation than the President. The House, more than the Senate or the Presi-
dent, prefers that new firms bear the costs of pollution control. The ideal
points on the stringency-cost tradeoff among the House, the Senate, and the
President are represented in the figure by H, S, and P.
In Figure 3, the original 1970 policy is represented by point Qo. The court
decision in Sierra Club and the EPA's promulgated regulation moved the
policy to point B. The new policy was in the Pareto optimal set formed by
the preferences just identified. There are two implications of this change in
policy. First, as in our previous analysis, a return to the original policy, Qo,
is not possible. Indeed, the new policy cannot be significantly amended.
Second, the House was the principal beneficiary of the change, for it
favored a combination of relatively strict long-term goals for air quality
(which reflected the desires of its urban constituency for cleaner air) and an
implementation strategy that would minimally disrupt established economic
patterns of development (which reflected its relatively greater sensitivity to
narrow industrial interests). PSD strengthened standards in areas that
already had clean air. It also slowed progress towards air quality goals by
giving greater protection to established industries. A clear implication of
EPA's promulgated PSD rules, together with the provisions of the 1970
Amendments regarding new sources, was that existing facilities would be
protected against the possibility that stringent air pollution regulation would
hasten their obsolescence.14 Consider the requirements for new sources.
Generally, it is less expensive to achieve a given degree of pollution abate-
ment per unit of production in a new facility than in an old one. The reason
is that the abatement system can be included in a new plant's original design,
but must be fit into an older plant. Hence, a "least cost" strategy for achiev-
ing a given air quality target will often involve replacing older facilities with
newer ones. New source performance standards protected existing firms
against this eventuality by imposing less demanding requirements on them.
This strategy would be far less effective if it applied only to areas with
severe air pollution problems. In areas where emissions could increase sig-
nificantly without causing air quality to fall short of national standards, new
facilities could be built that might face even lower costs of confrol than those
facing established facilities in areas with poor air quality. Nationwide NSPS
combined with PSD rules impose on these new facilities a set of regulations
almost as demanding as they'would face if they located in an area with dirty
air. Hence, NSPS and PSD implement the twin policies of improving air
quality and protecting established industries against a nationwide redistribu-
tion of economic activity due to air pollution regulation. Consequently, the
148 See B. Ackerman & W. Hassler, supra note 11, at 10-12.
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court's decision and EPA's subsequent PSD rules moved air pollution policy
toward the ideal point of the House.
III. THE USE OF STRUCTURE AND PROCESS TO ENFORCE
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The changes in structure and process proposed by each chamber in
response to the policy innovation of PSD reflect the basic differences in the
electoral considerations of the members of each house. These proposed
reforms had unambiguous consequences for environmental policy. In this
Part we show, first, that the structure and process enacted by Congress for
the implementation of air pollution policies by the EPA mirrored the con-
flict just described between the House and Senate; and second, that the pro-
cedures each chamber proposed, and those each eventually adopted, sought
to stack the deck in favor of the interests that chamber represented. As
discussed in Part II above, the House proposed procedures to enfranchise
local industry, whereas the Senate favored procedures that reduced the force
of EPA regulations. In almost every case neither house agreed to the
changes in PSD proposed by the other, thereby thwarting this avenue of
upsetting the status quo.
We examine proposed and enacted changes in the procedures for EPA
rulemaking, the standards of proof, and the standards of review of EPA
decisions. We then explore proposed changes in the system of civil represen-
tation for the EPA. We describe the debates surrounding the creation of the
National Commission on Air Quality (NCAQ), and show how members of
each chamber sought to use the NCAQ to alter and constrain the EPA
Administrator's ability to implement the new PSD provisions. Lastly, we
examine an attempt to enfranchise small independent auto repair shops into
EPA rulemaking on auto warranties.
A. Administrative Procedures
In its proposed 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, the House sought to
make EPA rulemaking dockets more formal, protracted, and detailed. The
House proposed raising the evidentiary standard from the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of the 1970 Amendments to a "substantial evidence"
test in 1977.149 In addition, the House proposed a more restrictive standard
under which courts could invalidate EPA rules-namely, that the agency's
error had been so "serious and related to matters of such central relevance
... that there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been signifi-
cantly changed if such errors had not been made."15 The House also speci-
149 H.R. 6161, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 305(a), 123 Cong. Ree. 16,967 (1977).
I50 Id.
[Vol. 75:431
Political Control of Agencies
fled elaborate rules regarding the content of rulemaking dockets, and
required that more elaborate public hearings and defenses of agency deci-
sions be undertaken.1 51
More elaborate procedures are generally regarded as favorable to regu-
lated industries. Because industries possess much of the information rele-
vant to regulatory decisions, elaborate processes give them more power by
increasing the importance of that information. Another contributing factor
is that industries, with greater economic stakes in regulatory issues, are more
likely to devote the resources necessary to be effectively represented in
expensive proceedings. In this case, established industries (old sources) are
more likely to be advantaged by cumbersome proceedings. In the develop-
ment of NSPS, most of the facilities to which these standards would apply
do not exist at the time the regulations are promulgated, and for that reason
they are less likely to have their interests effectively represented. Indeed, the
House hearings indicate that industrial groups representing established
industries strongly supported most of the procedural changes that the House
Commerce Committee eventually reported.152 This is consistent with the
view that the House did not want to disrupt existing patterns of industry
through air pollution regulation.
In the Senate, no procedural changes of these types were adopted in 1976
or 1977, and in conference much of what the House had proposed was
removed. 153 For example, the recommended "substantial evidence" stan-
dard for judicial review was deleted, and the provision requiring cross-exam-
ination of witnesses at public hearings on proposed rulemaking was replaced
151 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1502, 1558. For example, the 1977 Amendments contained provisions
that specified what documents were to be included in the docket: (1) a statement of the basis
and purpose of the rule including all data, information, and documents pertinent to the
rulemaking procedures; (2) all written comments and documentary information that was of
central relevance to the rulemaking; (3) the transcript of any public hearings on the proposed
rule; and (4) draft proposals and accompanying documents submitted by the Administrator to
the Office of Management and Budget, interagency comments on the proposal, and EPA
responses to those comments. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
§ 307(d)(3)-(4), 91 Stat. 685, 778-79 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7617 (1982)); see also H.R. Rep.
No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 318-25, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1077, 1397-1404 (summarizing House Commerce Committee's reasons for proposed changes
in administrative procedures).
152 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 4151 and H.R. 4758 Before
the Subcomin. on Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 958, 1003, 1044-45 (1977) (statements of Kenneth Tucker,
Vice President, Int'l Council of Shopping Centers; Robert Arquila, President, Nat'l Ass'n of
Home Builders; and Edward Weber, Ass't Gen'l Counsel, Republic Steel Corp.).
153 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code
Oong. & Admin. News 1502, 1558-59.
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by one that permitted only written rebuttals. 154 Perhaps most significantly,
the Senate refused to accept the House proposal of a one-house legislative
veto over EPA rules.1 55 Moreover, although the Senate adopted several
House provisions that made EPA's procedures somewhat more elaborate, it
insisted that this not affect EPA review of state implementation plans.1 56
Because SIPs are the primary vehicles for regulating existing stationary
sources, they contain most of the regulations for established facilities. Pres-
ervation of a simple, flexible process for reviewing SIPs meant that specific
industries would be less advantaged procedurally in the review of the regula-
tions pertaining to them. To the extent that an industry was advantaged
procedurally, it was also advantaged in more general rulemaking, such as the
establishment of national ambient air quality standards, NSPS, or emissions
standards for mobile sources and hazardous pollutants, all of which affected
Senate as well as House constituents.
B. Agency Representation Before the Courts
Another proposed change involved the relationships between the Depart-
ment of Justice and the EPA in the latter's representation before federal
courts. The 1970 Amendments authorized the Attorney General to repre-
sent the EPA in all cases appearing in federal courts.15 7 Of course, the rela-
tionship between the Justice Department and the EPA is not parallel to a
normal attorney-client relationship. The Justice Department is itself a poli-
cymaking agency, and historically it has been especially closely tied to the
President. Thus, when the EPA's staff promulgates a rule that is appealed
by an interested party, granting the Attorney General authority to defend
the rule creates a de facto veto power that could undermine the defense of
the EPA's policy decisions. Of course, one of the most important examples
of EPA representation was the Sierra Club case,158 in which the Justice
Department defended the EPA's decision not to adopt PSD rules.
In 1976, the House Commerce Committee bill 159 included a provision
stripping the Attorney General of his authority to represent the EPA in
court, and would instead have authorized the Administrator to do so unless
154 Id.
155 Id. at 188-89, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 1569.
156 Id. at 177, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 1558.
157 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1707 (1970)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7605 (1982)).
158 Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an
equally divided Court sub nom. Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
159 H.R. 10,498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 Cong. Rec. 30,798 (1976).
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he requested that the Attorney General prosecute the case."6 On the House
floor, Representative M. Caldwell Butler of Virginia proposed an amend-
ment to delete this section of the Committee's bill, stating that one agency
should be responsible for all federal litigation and that creating a separate
litigation staff in the EPA was a "wasteful duplication of resources and
efforts." '1 6 1 Reflecting the power of House rules to protect committee pro-
posals, Committee member Richardson Preyer of North Carolina immedi-
ately offered a substitute for the Butler amendment that restored most of
what the Committee had proposed. 162 Preyer's substitute gave the Justice
Department the right to represent the EPA before the Supreme Court and
made the Department a party to decisions about whether the EPA should
appeal; however, the EPA could represent itself before the courts of appeals
(but not the Supreme Court) as long as the Justice Department agreed that
an appeal could be made.' 63 The House adopted Preyer's substitute to the
Butler amendment.'" In 1977, when the Committee again reported a bill to
amend the Clean Air Act, the Preyer amendment was included in the bill. 6
The Senate, on the other hand, simply never considered the question of
EPA representation in either its 1976 or 1977 bills. In neither year did the
Senate Public Works Committee propose to change the system of representa-
tion, and in neither year was such an amendment proposed on the Senate
floor. 166 In the final version of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments (1977
Amendments), the Justice Department's responsibility to represent the EPA
remained, subject, however, to the provisions of a memorandum of under-
standing between the EPA and the Department of Justice that retained the
Department's overall supervision, but gave the EPA's lawyers a formal role
in developing litigation strategy.' 67 The 1977 Amendments state that litiga-
tion was to be conducted in accordance with this memorandum of
160 Id. § 311, 122 Cong. Rec. 30,798; see also H.R. Rep. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 272-
77 (1976) (discussing the legislative intent of this proposal).
161 122 Cong. Rec. 30,499 (1976).
162 Id. at 30,499-500.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 30,503.
165 H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, 332-337, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1077, 1411-16.
166 Neither conference report contained mention of a Senate proposal regarding EPA
representation. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1976); H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 173, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1502, 1554.
167 42 U.S.C. § 7605(b) (1982); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-
76, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1502, 1554-57 (discussing





This episode illustrates a number of important points. The controversy
over representation indicates that all participants regarded the issue as
important to the development of the details of environmental regulation.
Moreover, the House was much more concerned about the Justice Depart-
ment's policy role in environmental matters than were either the Senate or
the Administration. In the end, the latter two gave in on one element: the
special expertise of the agency demanded that its role in developing cases
involving the agency be guaranteed. But the status quo under which the
Justice Department supervised litigation whenever the Attorney General
(and presumably the President) wanted was not changed. The implication is
that the House had different policy objectives than either the Senate or the
President-objectives that were threatened by the lack of autonomy at the
EPA in representing itself in court.
It is impossible to ascertain precisely what policy issues so concerned the
House. But one was that the EPA, after initiating the process regarding
PSD, first rejected the PSD proposal in accordance with the Justice Depart-
ment's recommendation, and then had this position vigorously defended by
the Justice Department in court. One plausible inference from this sequence
of events, as Melnick has previously argued, 169 is that the EPA initially
wanted to adopt PSD, but decided against doing so after the Administration
intervened. If so, the attempt by the House to insulate the EPA from the
Justice Department, and the failure of the Senate to comply, is consistent
with our hypotheses about the relative policy preferences of each. It also
supports the view that the strong role given the Justice Department in the
1970 Amendments constituted a procedural protection for the Senate and
the President against precisely the kind of drift in agency policy that the
House preferred-and ultimately obtained from the courts.
C. The Use of Studies to Control Agency Rulemaking
Congress often constrains the ability of an agency to control the flow of
information relevant to its rulemaking activities as it did in the 1977 Amend-
ments. This is most often accomplished by requiring that some third party
conduct an independent study, or in some cases a joint study with the
agency, the results of which affect the agency's rulemaking in some fash-
ion. 170 These requirements have two effects. First, the third party
168 Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 304(a), 91 Stat. 685, 772 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 7605 (1982)).
169 See generally R. Melnick, supra note 11, at 71-80 (recounting the history of the Sierra
Club litigation).
170 See Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 403(a), 91 Stat. 685, 792
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7548 (1982)); Toxic Substances Control Act, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 2624
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enfranchises an important set of constituents interested in the agency's deci-
sions.171 Second, the structure establishes a fire alarm oversight system.' 72
Because the study group has access to all of the information available to the
agency, and because their mandate is to inform Congress, the study group is
in a perfect position to provide third party oversight for members of
Congress.
Both aspects of third party studies serve to restrict agency decisionmak-
ing. Because a study group gives members of congressional committees
greater ability to oversee the actions of their agencies, its creation induces
agency bureaucrats to comply with congressional wishes. The higher the
probability that noncompliant behavior will be discovered, the more effective
politicians can be in structuring the agency's incentives. On occasion, Con-
gress makes this incentive more direct by formally linking the agency's deci-
sionmaking to the group's findings.' 73 For example, Congress may require
consultation between the agency and a study group, occasionally requiring
that a study be conducted jointly by the two. Or it may require the agency
to obtain the study group's agreement on proposed actions. In other
instances, Congress may require that the study group's report be part of the
agency's proceedings, thereby forcing the agency to respond to the report in
its decisionmaking. This also constrains the agency, for the report can then
be used as evidence against the agency in court.
For example, the EPA was authorized to undertake several studies in the
1977 Amendments.174 Congress also chose to delegate some studies jointly
to the EPA and other agencies and in some instances to bypass the EPA and
(1982) (authorizing a study on establishing a standard classification system of chemicals and
related substances and a standard storage and access system for retrieving the information).
171 For example, with respect to establishing air quality criteria, Congress provided that the
Administrator of the EPA may "establish a standing consulting committee for each air
pollutant ... which shall be comprised of technically qualified individuals representative of
State and local governments, industry, and the academic community." 42 U.S.C. § 7408(b)(2)
(1982). Congress also required the EPA to utilize third parties in promulgating a national
primary air quality standard for nitrous oxides. To assist the EPA, the 1977 Amendments
provided for a seven-member independent scientific review committee composed of "at least
one member of the National Academy of Sciences, one physician, and one person representing
State air pollution control agencies." Congress mandated that the committee "shall complete
a review of the criteria published under section 7408 [of Title 42] ... and shall recommend to
the Administrator any new national ambient air quality standards and revisions.., as may be
appropriate." Id. § 7409(d).
172 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
173 See, e.g., Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 403(f), 91 Stat. 685, 793
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7548 (1982)) (authorizing the EPA and the National Academy of
Sciences to study the effects of emissions on the "public health and welfare" and the
technological feasibility of meeting emissions standards).
174 Id. §§ 403-405, 91 Stat. at 792-95 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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to rely completely on a third agency to undertake studies for the EPA and
Congress. For example, Congressmen concerned about the effect a ban on
aerosols would have on the cosmetics and household products industries
required the Secretary of Labor to study the effects of a ban on the use of
halocarbons in aerosol containers. 175 On the same topic, the Administrator
was required to establish a coordinating committee for regulating halo-
carbons. Congress required that the committee include the National Ocean-
ographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National
Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the National Cancer Insti-
tute, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, the National
Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of State. 176 This coordinat-
ing committee was to report to "the appropriate committees of the House
and the Senate," not to the EPA. 177 NOAA, NASA, NSF, the Department
of Agriculture, and HEW each were also delegated responsibilities to under-
take continuing studies on ozone and halocarbons. 17' The National Acad-
emy of Sciences (NAS) was asked to conduct three separate studies. 179
In other instances, Congress has required the EPA to consider a study
group's findings. For example, the EPA was ordered to include a statement
of a rule's basis and purpose in any notice of proposed rulemaking.180 Con-
gress added a requirement to the 1977 Amendments that such statements
shall also set forth or summarize and provide a reference to any perti-
nent findings, recommendations, and comments by the Scientific
Review Committee established under section 7409(d) of this title [42]
and the National Academy of Sciences, and, if the proposal differs in
any important respects from any of these recommendations, an expla-
nation of the reasons for such differences. All data, information, and
documents referred to in this paragraph on which the proposed rule
relies shall be included in the docket on the date of publication of the
proposed rule."
175 42 U.S.C. § 7453(e) (1982).
176 Id. § 7453(f).
177 Id. § 7453(g).
178 Id. § 7454.
179 Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 106(a), 403(a), 405(a), 91 Stat.
685, 691, 792-93 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
180 Id. § 305(a), 91 Stat. at 774 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1982)).
181 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (1982).
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1. The National Commission on Air Quality
The use of studies to enfranchise the interests of each party to an enacting
coalition, to create a more effective fire alarm oversight system, and to mir-
ror the policy conflicts at the time of legislative enactment are exemplified in
the debate surrounding the creation of the National Commission on Air
Quality. This debate illustrates the strategic use of structure and process to
constrain agency decisions.
The Senate proposed to make the "achievement and maintenance of
national ambient air quality standards" and "prevention of significant deteri-
oration" the NCAQ's principal areas of investigation.182 Secondarily, the
Senate would have authorized the NCAQ to examine unregulated pollutants
and to address the adequacy of abatement research and development and the
ability of federal, local, and state agencies to implement the purposes of the
Clean Air Act.18 3
The 1976 Senate bill proposed a sixteen-member NCAQ comprised of
twelve members of the public (including four governors), to be appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and four nonvoting
Congressmen. The four governors or their appointed representatives would
have provided state input into the congressional advisory reports. In effect,
the NCAQ would have provided a means for the states to check EPA
actions. It would also have been required to seek consultation from federal,
state, and local agencies. To facilitate congressional oversight, the chairman
and ranking minority member of both the Senate Public Works Committee
and the House Commerce Committee would have been nonvoting ex officio
members.'8
4
The 1976 House amendment to the Senate bill would have established a
similarly structured NCAQ composed of eleven members, including the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Public Works Com-
mittee and the House Commerce Committee.18 5 The House conference
committee report reflected many of the same concerns as the Senate commit-
tee report, except that this version reflected a greater concern with the effect
of EPA regulations on the automobile industry. The final version of the bill
required the NCAQ to focus its studies on the "extent to which the reduc-
tion of hydrocarbon emissions is an adequate or appropriate method to
achieve primary standards for photochemical oxidants"' 6 as well as the
means of achieving and maintaining "national ambient air quality standards
182 S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 38, 122 Cong. Rec. 30,773 (1976).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. § 108(f), 122 Cong. Rec. 30,783 (House amendment to Senate bill).
186 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1976).
1989] 475
Virginia Law Review
and . . . the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality,"18 7 the
Senate's primary concern.
The strategic use of structure and process-in this case the requirement of
a study-to constrain agency decisions is exemplified by the attempts in both
chambers to amend the provisions creating the NCAQ. In the 1976 Senate
debate, the central area of controversy was the relationship between the pro-
posed NCAQ study to the implementation of PSD requirements as defined
in section 6 of the Senate bill.
Early in the debate, the Chairman of the Senate Public Works Committee,
Jennings Randolph of West Virginia, offered an amendment concerning
timetables and procedures for the NCAQ that assumed the immediate
implementation and enforcement of the nondeterioration provision. The
NCAQ was to give priority to a study of the implementation of the PSD
provisions in the Clean Air Act and was required to submit a report of its
conclusions to Congress within two years.18 The report was to focus on
whether the increments of change in air quality were appropriate to prevent
significant deterioration of air quality in class I and class II areas. The
NCAQ's authority in the area of significant deterioration, however, was to
be constrained because the Randolph amendtnent gave the EPA authority
over the funds needed to support the NCAQ study.1 89 It would be directed
to provide information to assist Congress in determining future air pollution
programs.1 90 According to Senator Randolph, the NCAQ was to assist
Congress in closely watching the results of its efforts. Randolph added: "We
must not forget to do this. We must monitor the program. We must have
the oversight hearings. We must be very careful to see that the intent of
Congress is carried out, as well as the actual language of the law." '191
In debating the timetable Randolph proposed for the NCAQ study, Sena-
tor Frank Moss of Utah, an opponent of PSD, offered an amendment that
sought to delete the provision related to prevention of significant deteriora-
tion so that there would be no legislation on that subject until the NCAQ's
study was complete.1 92 Moss's action was understandable, given that he rep-
resented a state with many class I areas (parks), and therefore sought to limit
the applicability of PSD. The Moss amendment would have further altered
the context and timetable of the reports to be submitted. Investigations were
to consider the effects of "existing or proposed national ambient air quality
standards," as well as the effects of any "existing or proposed policy of
187 Id.
188 122 Cong. Rec. 23,961 (1976) (provision of the Randolph amendment).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 23,962 (statement of Senator Randolph).
192 Id. at 25,148.
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prohibiting deterioration of air quality in areas identified as better than
required."1 93 The NCAQ would be directed to submit a report of appropri-
ate recommendations and results of studies one year after enactment. A sec-
ond report was to be submitted "with regard to all other Commission studies
and investigations, together with any appropriate recommendations, not
later than three years after the date of enactment" of the bill.194
The proposed Moss study would have addressed the concerns that
nondegradation would have an adverse impact on the economy and land use.
The primary intent of the Moss amendment was to strike the nondeteriora-
tion proposal so that there would be no legislation until the Commission's
report was complete. It was argued that the delay in legislation would pro-
vide Congress with the opportunity to obtain adequate information before
arbitrarily setting emission standards. During the time the study was to be
conducted, existing EPA regulations would remain in force.1 95 The Moss
amendment was supported by the National Construction Industry Coun-
cil,196 the National Rural Elect Cooperation Association,1 97 President Ger-
ald Ford,1 98 and the Builders and Construction Trades of the AFL-CIO.1 99
Nevertheless, the Senate rejected the amendment by a 63-31 vote.2"
Two other Senators from areas that would have been hard hit by PSD
requirements introduced similar amendments. Senator James Allen of Ala-
bama offered an amendment to the Randolph amendment that woad have
provided for the enactment of the significant deterioration proposal (similar
to the Randolph amendment discussed above), but would have suspended
implementation and enforcement of PSD rules until one year after the Com-
mission's report.20 1
In another attempt to delay PSD regulations, Senator William Scott of
Virginia proposed that "during the period of the [NCAQ] study... nothing
in [the Clean Air Act] shall be construed to require or provide for the estab-
lishment of Federal standards more stringent than primary and secondary
air quality standards.,202 The Senate rejected both the Scott and the Allen
amendments by substantial majorities, 20 3 but approved the Randolph
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 24,536.
196 Id. at 25,150.
197 Id. at 25,156.
198 Id. at 25,150.
199 Id. at 15,155.
200 Id. at 25,192.
201 Id. at 25,541.
202 Id. at 25,159.
203 The Scott amendment was defeated by a vote of 74-17, id. at 25,178, and the Allen
amendment was defeated by a vote of 59-23, id. at 25,550.
1989] 477
Virginia Law Review
amendment by the overwhelming margin of 83-1.2"
The House also debated the role of the NCAQ. The original House bill
did not provide for such a commission, 20 5 so Representative Paul Rogers of
Florida, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environ-
ment, offered an amendment calling for the formation of the NCAQ.20 6 The
Rogers amendment was similar to the Randolph amendment in the Senate in
that it would have implemented the new PSD regulations and a study by the
NCAQ on air quality deterioration concurrently.20 7
Like Senator Randolph, Representative Rogers faced a series of amend-
ments from colleagues who sought to delay implementation of the new PSD
regulations until the NCAQ study was completed. Claiming that the House
proposal for new nondeterioration policies was based on "scanty informa-
tion," Representative Bill Chappell of Florida offered an amendment-simi-
lar to the Moss amendment in the Senate-that would have left the existing
EPA regulations on nondeterioration unaffected until the NCAQ study was
concluded.20" Representative Chappell argued that his amendment would
provide Congress and the EPA with an opportunity to learn more about the
effects of the nondeterioration proposal on the economy and the environ-
ment.209 But like the Senate, the House rejected all attempts to delay imple-
mentation of the study, and rejected the Chappell amendment by a vote of
199-156.210 It approved the Rogers amendment by a margin of 301-57,21
and the final version of the House bill contained the NCAQ proposal.2 12
Ultimately, the composition of the NCAQ in the 1977 Amendments
reflected a compromise between the House and Senate over which constitu-
ent group interests to incorporate into EPA decisionmaking. As enacted,
the bill provided:
Such Commission shall be composed of eleven members, including
the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Committee
on Public Works and the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce... and seven members of the public appointed by the
President .... Not more than one-third of the members of the Com-
mission may have any interest in any business or activity regulated
204 Id. at 25,552.
205 See H.R. 10,498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 Cong. Rec. 29,216 (1976).
206 122 Cong. Ree. 29,234 (1976).
207 Id.
208 Id. at 29,244.
209 Id. at 29,255.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 29,242.
212 Id. at 29,243.
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under this Act.213
Interestingly, in the final version of the bill, members of Congress on the
Commission did not serve ex officio, but instead had an active role in shap-
ing the Commission's studies and recommendations. 214
The focus of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments also reflected a com-
promise between the Senate and House proposals. Under the 1977 Amend-
ments, the Commission was to focus on both emissions from mobile sources
and the implications of significant deterioration.215 The Commission's juris-
diction over the issue of nondegradation, however, was severely limited by
the requirement that the NAS conduct studies on the same subject.216
The debate over the creation of the NCAQ illustrates three important
points. First, the composition of its membership was of critical importance,
for it determined which constituents were represented and, therefore, which
constituents had the ability to affect the EPA's activities through the-
NCAQ's study. This aspect of the NCAQ was one important difference
between the Senate and House provisions, with each favoring a panel that
represented their interests. Second, the NCAQ demonstrated congressional
intent to use studies to oversee agency activity. Again, the House and Senate
differed as to the principal mission of the NCAQ, each wanting it to focus on
different aspects of EPA policy. Third, the attempts to use the NCAQ to
forestall the implementation of PSD rules shows how procedures, in this
case a simple study, could be used to affect agency decisionmaking and the
policies that resulted from it.
D. Warranties
Another major point of controversy in the 1976 and 1977 debates was
over the establishment of emission standards for mobile sources. The history
of warranties for auto emissions control devices provides additional insight
into the use of procedures for policy purposes, as well as the differences
between the policy objectives of the House and Senate. The 1970 Amend-
ments required automobile manufacturers to provide a warranty on pollu-
tion control devices for five years or 50,000 miles.217 Soon thereafter, it
became apparent that manufacturers would respond by requiring that their
emission control devices be maintained and repaired by their own authorized
213 Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 313, 91 Stat. 685, 787, repealed by
Act of July 2, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-300, § 1(c), 94 Stat. 831 (1980).
214 Id., 91 Stat. at 787.
215 Id., 91 Stat. at 785.
216 Id., 91 Stat. at 787-88.
217 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1692
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7521(d)(1) (1982)).
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mechanics-for the most part ,the dealers who sold their cars. Not surpris-
ingly, independent automobile mechanics expressed concern that by linking
the warranty to dealer maintenance, they would lose a substantial portion of
their regular repair business to the authorized dealers. The independent
mechanics received some support from the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), which warned the EPA that the warranty provisions would be
anticompetitive if they unfairly tied a car owner to the dealer who sold the
car.
2 18
The House, ever sensitive to the concerns of any industry, responded by
making three proposals in its 1976 bill. First, it limited the warranty to
eighteen months or 18,000 miles, thereby shortening the period of tied main-
tenance.2 19 Second, it authorized the FTC to undertake a study of the com-
petitive effects of its warranty requirements, thereby formally requesting that
the agency elaborate on its earlier warnings to the EPA. Third, it authorized
the EPA to increase the warranty to five years or 50,000 miles, but only if
the FTC agreed. This gave the FTC a veto power over the EPA's decision.
Moreover, it required that the EPA find that the longer warranty had "no
significant anticompetitive effects.",
221
The Senate's actions were similar to those of the House in some ways but
not others. The Senate Public Works Committee proposed to keep the five
year/50,000 mile requirement; however, it also authorized the FTC to study
its anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the Committee asked the FTC to
report to Congress, not to the EPA.22 1 But it did not allow the FTC to veto
EPA decisions, nor did it set up a procedure under which the EPA could
alter the terms of warranties.
In the floor debate, Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas proposed an amend-
ment almost identical to the House proposal, which expressed his deep con-
cern about "the 400,000 independent repair shops in this country, 1,700
independent parts manufacturers, and 22,000 independent parts distribu-
tors" that he believed would be adversely affected by retaining the five year/
50,000 mile warranty instead of adopting the eighteen month/18,000 mile
warranty proposal.22 2 Bentsen's proposed amendment was defeated by a 51-
45 vote.2 23
The 1977 House and Senate bills were essentially identical to their propos-
als of a year earlier, and so a conference committee was again called upon to
resolve the dispute. The tradeoff was clear enough. Automobile manufac-
218 S. Rep. No. 717, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1976).
219 H.R. Rep. No. 1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1976).
220 Id. at 236.
221 S. Rep. No. 717, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1976).
222 122 Cong. Rec. 24,299 (1976).
223 Id. at 24,313.
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turers could not fairly be required to give a warranty on a device that others
would maintain and repair; however, an important constituency was deeply
offended by the government requiring that all its customers do business with
its competitors. The Senate was willing to study the issue, but in this case
wanted the more stringent provision. The House wanted to allow the FTC,
an antitrust watchdog, to veto any proposal for more than a minimum war-
ranty period. Knowing the proclivities of the FTC, which had already
expressed its position on the matter, one could rationally expect that this
was tantamount to enacting the weaker warranty.
Congress compromised on an intermediate warranty of two years or
24,000 miles."2 Interestingly, although both the House and the Senate had
passed bills requesting an FTC study, the conference report (and the 1977
Amendments) contained no such provision. In addition, the bill did not
require that the EPA revise the warranty requirement and, of course, did not
give the FTC a veto power over such a proposal.
CONCLUSION
The theory developed in this Article focuses on the problem of controlling
bureaucratic agents and has two implications. First, it shows how an ex post
legislative solution is a cumbersome and generally ineffective tool against
bureaucrats who deviate from the policies preferred by politicians. Within
limits, politicians are unlikely to be able to reverse a bureaucratic decision so
long as bureaucrats deviate in a way that makes one of the major political
actors better off than they were under the status quo. But this does not
imply that the situation for politicians is hopeless. The second implication of
the theory is that the main avenue for controlling bureaucrats is to place ex
ante procedural constraints on the decisionmaking process. If these con-
straints allow politicians to respond to agency deviations prior to the
agency's implementation of a change in policy, they can provide effective
control over agency decisions.
We showed how administrative procedures play this critical role, and that
they do so in several ways. First, by imposing a particular sequence on
agency decisionmaking, they create an "early warning" system that alerts
politicians (and their constituents) that an agency may attempt to change
course. Second, the process itself imposes delay, affording ample time for
politicians to intervene before an agency can present them with a fait accom-
pli. Third, procedures allow politicians to adjust the set of pressures from
the environment the agency faces, and in so doing, to stack the deck in favor
of certain constituents.
224 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 168, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1502, 1549.
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The Article ends with a case study of air pollution control regulation.
This study shows that politicians were concerned with procedures as a
means of influencing agency decisionmaking throughout the 1960s and
1970s. The discussion of the court's unanticipated change in policy, in its
1972 decision in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,z25 shows how difficult ex post
legislative changes are, and in particular, that politicians were unable to
reestablish the status quo. The analysis in Part III shows that the 1977
Amendments to the Clear Air Act, the main legislative reaction to Sierra
Club, were primarily procedural. The review of the considerations of this
legislation reveals how different politicians attempted to use procedure to
benefit their own constituents. Most of these attempts were unsuccessful
because other legislators saw that the proposed changes would thwart their
own policy objectives.
225 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court sub noam.
Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
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